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**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE  
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

**Country Report: ZIMBABWE**

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**SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION**  
**Country Report: Zimbabwe**

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**List of Acronyms**  
**Southern Africa Drought Evaluation**  
**Zimbabwe Country Report**

AGRITEX	Agricultural Technical and Extension Services
A.I.D.	United States Agency for International Development, headquarters
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSFP	Child Supplementary Feeding Program
DSW	Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FSTAU	Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit, SADC
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAC	Logistic Advisory Center, SADC and WFP
MLAWD	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development
MOHCW	Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
MPSL&SW	Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare
MT	Metric ton
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
NCPCC	National Civil Protection Coordination Committee
NEWU	National Early Warning Unit, AGRITEX, Zimbabwe
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
REWU	Regional Early Warning Unit, SADC, in Zimbabwe's Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference (until treaty of August 1992, when the organization became SADC)
SCF	Save the Children Foundation
SDA	Social Dimensions of Adjustment
SDF	Social Dimensions Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

## SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

### Country Report: Zimbabwe

#### HIGHLIGHTS

- ✓ Zimbabwe's seasonal rains began in November 1991 but then rather abruptly stopped. The shortfall of rain was not a mid-season variation, but a major failure that lasted through the entire growing season, past March 1992.
- ✓ The 1991/92 drought led to an almost complete crop failure in most of Zimbabwe and threatened the welfare of a very large portion of the country's population and economy. Maize production was only about 20 percent of recent annual averages. By mid-August 1992 critical water shortages affected major towns and parts of several provinces, as 30 percent of wells and boreholes dried up and more than half the big dams were below 30 percent of capacity. The effects of these shortfalls were felt most severely by the 6.2 million communal farm residents in rural areas who depend largely on agriculture for their survival.
- ✓ Although initially slow to heed warnings of food shortages, once the evidence of drought was clear, Zimbabwe managed successfully to avert disastrous consequences of the drought:
  - there were no deaths from famine;
  - deaths from drought-related disease were minimal; and
  - people did not have to leave home and thus were able to resume planting when rains returned in late 1993.
- ✓ The Department of Social Welfare launched a nationwide registration campaign, with the result that by July 1992, 4.5 million persons had been approved and registered for relief assistance. As the effects of the drought augmented, and people became aware of the availability of relief food, the total number of registrations grew, until it reached 5.6 million (or 54 percent of the total population) in November. Neither urban residents nor commercial farm residents were included in the registration campaign.
- ✓ Had it not been for the unprecedented magnitude of grain imports required, Zimbabwe could have responded successfully on its own:
  - the government purchased the first imports, and over half the total;
  - physical infrastructure and internal distribution systems were adequate to get the food to the needy without major gaps in coverage;

- private sector shipping agents and transport operators mobilized to meet the extraordinary demands of the emergency;
  - coordination among public and private bodies concerned with movement of food was achieved at the national level under high level inter-ministerial subcommittees of the National Disaster Task Force, and at provincial and district levels by dedicated cooperating officials. Most relief programs, were carried out effectively by existing government structures.
- ✓ The success of Zimbabwe's drought response is attributable in largest measure to the commitment of their own resources by the government and the people of Zimbabwe as well as to the mobilization of external assistance, most notably from World Food Program (WFP) and the United States, for food and assistance in transport logistics. Mobilization by WFP and the United States was prompt and effective. Nevertheless, it was a full 12 months from the U.S. Ambassador's declaration of disaster to the first free distribution of sorghum to vulnerable households.
- ✓ Fully half of total maize imports were financed by Zimbabwe from its own reserves or borrowings, and another 27 percent was provided by donors on credit terms. Only 11 percent of required imports were provided to Zimbabwe on grant terms.
- ✓ USAID was in the forefront in:
- alerting A.I.D. and other donors to the severity of the drought;
  - recognizing that regional transport logistics required priority attention;
  - drawing on the accomplishments of the Southern Africa Regional Program, and the capabilities of the institutions it supported, to introduce transport efficiencies, break logistic bottlenecks, improve border procedures and produce improved varieties of small grain seeds for post drought recovery planting;
  - bringing in the Africa Bureau's FEWS project to help analyze country data so as to identify the most vulnerable people; and
  - committing funds for the leasing of South African locomotives and rail wagons by the railways of other countries of the region.
- ✓ USAID staff could draw on experience in drought relief; the Director, who had extensive personal experience himself, brought on additional staff having expertise in drought relief and commodity monitoring, food aid and transport management.

- ✓ The United States provided a massive amount of food assistance to Zimbabwe, and was the largest bilateral contributor of non-food aid. The 672,475 MT of maize provided by the United States represented 27 percent of the total consumption during the drought emergency period of January 1992 through May 1993.
- ✓ The combination of monitoring systems employed by the national government, private sector and USAID assured that the U.S.-provided food was delivered with a loss of less than 1.5 percent, that the food reached intended beneficiaries, and that households in the most areas were managing to get enough food for survival.
- ✓ Not only was the drought response managed without serious detriment to the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, but the increase in the gap between local prices and import parity prices for maize triggered a decision to eliminate the consumer subsidy. The changes in maize pricing were instrumental in promoting a high level of production in the 1992/93 season. Those reforms, and others that followed, show promise of having a positive effect on Zimbabwe's long term development prospects.
- ✓ The distribution of agricultural input packets to smallholder farmers (some of which originated in the USAID-funded special production project for sorghum and pearl millet seeds) contributed to a significant recovery in agricultural output.
- ✓ Relief foods were distributed through existing government and parastatal systems, with some assistance from NGOs in the final distribution to remote areas.
- ✓ Both public and private sectors made extraordinary contributions to regional logistics management to ensure not only that Zimbabwe's food import needs were met, but also those of its neighbors.
- ✓ Zimbabwe, together with the SADC organizations located in Zimbabwe, is committed to continuing institutions and processes established during the drought, and otherwise benefiting from lessons learned:
  - The Regional and National Early Warning Units will seek to improve their ability to capture the attention of their clients, and will undertake a pilot project to establish a database of indicators of food security at the household level.
  - The National Railways of Zimbabwe will upgrade its traffic monitoring and management capability in conjunction with the railways operations center in Johannesburg.

- The Department of Social Welfare will expand its capability to analyze nutritional needs at the household level, with the assistance of an A.I.D. project, and will, therefore, be in a better position to deal with politically-motivated manipulation of relief rolls.
- ✓ Zimbabwe needs a national policy to guide future decisions on the magnitude of food security grain stocks to be held by government and other aspects of food security.
- ✓ The country should consider how to establish a permanent drought preparedness planning capability. It has made a promising start toward recording lessons learned and identifying training needs through a number of workshops to review the recent experience.



## **I. Background<sup>1</sup>**

### **A. Country Overview**

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country of some 150,000 square miles endowed with minerals and agricultural potential, although less than twenty percent of the land is fertile enough, and receives enough rain, for crop production. The climate is subtropical, with variations in temperature dependent upon altitude. The middle plateau of the country lies 3,000-4,000 feet above sea level. A higher plateau, at 4,000-5,000 feet, runs from northeast to southwest, while the hilly northeast reaches 6,000-8,000 feet. In the north the land slopes down to the Zambezi River. In the southeast are the dry lands of the low veld.

Rain falls mainly from October into April, averaging 25-30 inches annually. Maize and other subsistence crops are planted in October and November, and harvest begins in April. Agricultural potential is varied, however, as less rain falls in the low-lying, arid regions, mainly in the south, but more (up to 48 inches) in the central plateau. Moreover, the rains are unreliable, providing sufficient moisture for crops or livestock in perhaps three of ten years and providing generously in another three years, yet failing to reach average levels in three-four years of the decade.

The country is governed as a parliamentary democracy with separate executive, legislative and judiciary functions, under a constitution adopted at independence in 1980. Administratively, the country is subdivided into eight provinces and 54 districts. Internal transport infrastructure is adequate, as is, for the time being and in the absence of drought, the electric power system. Paved roads link the major urban and industrial centers, and rail lines tie the country into an extensive southern African network. Telephone service lags behind demand.

The independent government came into office with a strong commitment to improving social services for the majority of the people. Primary school enrollment is about twice as high as that of pre-independence, secondary enrollment is more than eight times as high, and health services are vastly expanded. Population growth has outpaced growth in the productive sectors, and employment creation is well below the output of secondary education.

Growth in GDP in Zimbabwe averaged 3.2 percent between 1980 and 1990, but fluctuated with international demand for the country's primary products and with drought. The manufacturing sector, already relatively well developed before the imposition of UN sanctions against the Ian Smith regime in 1965, had been stimulated by its isolation from traditional sources of imports during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence period 1965-1979 to create a wide range of import-substituting products. Agriculture, the backbone of the economy, accounts for about 13 percent of GDP, but 70 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of employment. Overall growth averaged around 4.5 percent in 1988-1990, the years preceding the launching of a comprehensive economic structural adjustment program (ESAP).

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<sup>1</sup> This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex E.

The ESAP is aimed at reduction of the budget deficit, trade liberalization, decontrol of agricultural pricing and marketing, reduction of public service employment, easing of onerous controls on business, and adjustment of exchange rate and interest rate policies to promote exports and investment. To compensate for the hardship to lower income groups, some the country has also adopted a program to address the social dimensions of adjustment (SDA), which encompasses some protection against reduction in the budgets for health and education as well as subsidies for health services and school costs for needy families. These subsidies are administered by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) of the Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare, the same Department that is charged with relief programs for disabled persons, victims of the struggle for independence, refugees and drought-affected households. The severe drought of the 1991/92 season, the worst of the century, intensified the economic pinch already imposed by structural adjustment measures (see Section IV of Chronology, Annex A).

Despite the severity of economic constraints, when the government finally recognized it faced a critical shortage of grain stocks, with no prospect of replenishment through current production because of the drought, it dug into its restricted foreign exchange reserves to the extent of US\$ 750 million to finance commercial imports of food and agricultural products required as inputs to industry. Altogether, the government itself financed over half of its total food import needs during the crisis. In spite of the drain on foreign exchange, accompanied by losses stemming from the differences between subsidized local prices and world market prices of the imports, the structural adjustment program was kept on course, and domestic expenditures were partially recouped by a five percent levy on all corporate and private payers of income tax.

In 1993, the anticipated benefits of structural adjustment were beginning to appear, and prospects for growth were quite positive, especially in agriculture, as a consequence of seasonal rains at high normal levels in the 1992/93 season, a successful drought recovery program consisting of seed and fertilizer distribution and tractor plowing in late 1992, and liberalization of the agricultural marketing regime. There was a mood of optimism, as manufacturing and the stock market revived, interest rates eased and the rate of inflation came down to 20 percent. Two or three more good years are projected to be needed to bring farmers out of debt and expand consumer spending.

## **B. History of Drought Emergencies**

In Zimbabwe deficits in rainfall are not unusual; they are, in fact, an expected phenomenon of the weather pattern, as shown by rainfall statistics available from 1901 and analysis of rainfall patterns in accordance with a model developed in South Africa in the 1930s. Yet in some seasons rainfall deficits are so acute that the impact affects the whole spectrum of the economy and population. The most notable droughts in memory are those of 1946/47, 1967/68, 1972/73, 1982-84 and, now, 1991/92, which was the most severe of the entire century. In the past 20 years the impact of drought has been aggravated by other

factors, not all weather related. These include the cumulative effect of low amounts of rainfall in previous seasons, population growth, environmental degradation, and economic difficulties that restrict resources for speedy and effective rescue and recovery.

Meteorologically, drought is defined as a rain deficit of 25 percent or more. It is a sustained and regionally extensive but temporal occurrence of below average precipitation or naturally available water caused by climate fluctuations over an extended period. In hydrological terms drought occurs when there is a sustained deficit in surface runoff below normal conditions, or depletion of groundwater levels. In agricultural terms, drought occurs when rainfall amounts and distribution, soil water reserves and evaporation losses combined cause crop or livestock yields to diminish markedly.

### **C. The 1991/92 Emergency**

The immediate cause of the most severe drought of the century in 1991/92 is often attributed to *el nino*, the periodically occurring warm current in the Pacific Ocean that has often devastated the fishing and climate of the west coast of Latin America. In Zimbabwe, although drought is not always correlated with *el nino*, the association was present in 1991/92. In that season, crop production in the Southern Africa region deteriorated drastically as a result of a prolonged dry period.

In Zimbabwe, the immediate crisis, in 1991 and early 1992, can be attributed in part to the effects of agricultural and macroeconomic policies. The massive shortage of maize for consumption in the first quarter of 1992, preceding the due date of the failed crop, stemmed from a lower than normal production the previous year but also a government policy in 1990 and 1991 to export maize stocks in order to reduce storage costs and earn foreign exchange. Total holdings of maize by the Grain Marketing Board were down to 42,000 MT in March 1992, an amount sufficient for only about two weeks' of normal sales to millers.

During the period 1980 to 1990, there had been three periods of normal or above normal rains, during which farmers responding to price incentives provided above normal sales to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), and four drought periods during which GMB intake was below normal. As of March 1990, stocks were high, at 1,200,000 metric tons (MT), so high that a strategy to export to neighboring food deficit countries (often at prices below cost) was adopted. The following year, as the country's Economic Structural Adjustment Program got underway, the export strategy was seen also as a means of both reducing the budget deficit and improving the foreign exchange balance.

Unfortunately, however, the rains of the 1990/91 season had been relatively poor, and production levels were down, in spite of a substantial increase in the price offered to producers in August 1991 to stimulate maize planting and sales. Thus, when the rains began, but then stopped abruptly in November-December 1991, the national stocks were already low.

The drought of 1991/92 then led to an almost complete crop failure in most of the country and threatened the welfare of a very large portion of the country's population and economy (see Section IV of Annex A). Maize production, for example, was no more than 20 percent of recent average normal annual tonnages. By mid-August 1992 critical water shortages affected major towns and parts of several provinces, as 30 percent of wells and boreholes dried up and more than half the big dams were below 30 percent of their holding capacity. The effects of these shortfalls were felt most severely by the 6.2 million communal farm residents in rural areas who depend largely on agriculture for their survival.

The national economy and social service structure were strained also by an increase in the rate of immigration (of up to 5000 persons per week) from Mozambique, the most critically affected country, which was suffering from years of strife as well as the effects of the drought.

#### **D. The Country's Ability to Withstand and Manage the 1991/92 Emergency**

A number of factors enabled Zimbabwe to respond effectively to its drought emergency. Among these:

- adequate internal public and private transport and communications infrastructure;
- a competent and well-placed corps of decision-makers;
- a Department of Social Welfare that was experienced in drought relief programs (providing food to an average of 500,000 disabled and deprived persons per year);
- the will and generosity of many thousands of community leaders, government staff, NGO staff and other citizens;
- the energies of rural women who were called upon to fetch water and food, prepare food for household members, carry bulk food bags from the distribution point to the community and household, assist in preparation of supplemental feeding at clinics and schools and, when rains began again, prepare the soil and plant seeds; and
- the donor response that provided half the needed food imports.

Zimbabwe was also a key player in the organization and coordination of transport in the region to serve its own needs in conjunction with those of its landlocked neighbors (see Section III, D, below).

## **II. Design of the Response to the Drought**

### **A. Recognition of the Problem**

The slowness of the government to take action based on the alerts as to grain shortages and rainfall deficits provided by national and regional early warning systems and Grain Marketing Board is a matter of controversy in Zimbabwe. The forward thinking and leadership on the part of the USAID Director in Zimbabwe is, to the contrary, recognized within and outside Zimbabwe as having been a fundamentally positive factor in the alert, the beginnings of coordination and the mobilization of external resources and the region's and country's own assets and strengths.

The roles of the Regional Early Warning Unit of SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference) and of Zimbabwe's National Early Warning Unit, both supported through an FAO project, and of the SADCC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit, supported by the United States and other donors, fulfilled all reasonable expectations, and justified the continuing support they had been given. Alerts from the units based on meteorological and production data (crop forecasts, cloud cover analysis, and remote sensing images of vegetative cover) began in July 1991.

The immediate crisis in Zimbabwe was one merely of potential grain shortage, and was seen by most citizens and outside observers as the responsibility of government. Since independence, the government had maintained monopoly control of formal grain marketing, influenced production decisions through control of producer prices, subsidized consumers through control of retail prices, and managed imports and exports in accordance with current economic policy. It had also, beginning with a relief program for disabled and unemployed veterans of the struggle for independence, maintained a nationwide feeding program for needy individuals and households adversely affected by recurring drought.

As a result of a number of near term and recent policy moves, the government's stocks of grain were too low in late 1991 to carry the country to the end of the rainy season in April 1992. Those policies included a 1991 damper on maize production, especially by the more productive large-scale commercial farmers, following an overly successful stimulus by incentive prices in the early 1980s; and an export program to reduce grain storage costs and gain foreign exchange. In the event, the shortage was exacerbated in the extreme by the deficit of rain and consequent failure of maize, the staple subsistence crop. The seasonal rains began in November 1991 but then rather abruptly stopped. The shortfall of rain was not a mid-season variation, but a major failure that lasted through the entire growing season, past March 1992.

The Grain Marketing Board was aware as early as April 1991 that grain imports would be necessary before the harvest of April 1992. Stocks held by the parastatal board had been lower than normal, as a consequence of reduction of incentives to maize production and lower than normal rainfall the previous season. Those stocks had been further depleted, in addition,

by grain export contracts executed in accordance with policies adopted under the structural adjustment program to reduce the public deficit. It would have been possible in the second half of 1991 to obtain grain from South Africa, which had sufficient stocks for export up to the time of failure of the late 1991 rains. It was politically not palatable to make such a purchase; however, until after the annual meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State that was held in Zimbabwe in October 1991. A purchase of 200,000 metric tons (MT) was finally approved in December. The first half of the negotiated purchase began arriving in Zimbabwe in March 1992; the second half ultimately was not available.

On 11 February 1992, the United States Ambassador to Zimbabwe declared an emergency in Zimbabwe and requested US\$ 25,000 in assistance. As yet, the offices of Southern Africa and of Food for Peace, fully occupied with regular responsibilities and other crises, had not mobilized a response to the alerts from USAID missions, those in Zimbabwe and Zambia in particular. Moreover, at the World Bank-led Consultative Group meeting in Paris to discuss Zimbabwe's progress in structural adjustment, neither the government nor the Bank raised the question of the potential influence of drought-related factors on government performance. At the insistence of the USAID Director, however, the U.S. and other interested delegations discussed the situation at an informal luncheon meeting.

It was not until March that all actors were energized. The President of Zimbabwe declared a National Disaster and appointed a Task Force to deal with the crisis. The incipient Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the UN began to estimate the degree of disaster and need for assistance in the Southern Africa region. The FAO and World Food Program (WFP) launched joint food supply assessment missions. Following consultation in the region, WFP concluded that it should establish a regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, to coordinate information on ship movements and internal transport in order to help expedite food deliveries to the landlocked states of the region. For its own part, the United States also mounted a regional drought assessment in March and April 1992, under the leadership of the African office of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), which prepared recommendations for U.S. Government action.

Details of drought management events are presented in Section II of the Chronology in Annex A. Highlights of events in early warning and mobilization follow:

Dec 1990	Last agreement for commercial export of Zimbabwe grain.
Apr 1991	Grain Marketing Board (GMB) budget request for foreign exchange to import grains that would be needed by March 1992, considering continuing dry weather and the low intake of the current crop.

Jul 1991	Signals from the National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) and Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) that current crop production was very low, with warning that current stocks might not be sufficient to carry through to the early 1992 harvest.
Aug 1991	Grain Marketing Board (GMB) application for foreign exchange to import from South Africa to bridge the anticipated gap to March 1992.  GMB decision that it could not participate in triangular grain swap under discussion (to involve U.S. wheat to Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean maize to Zambia).
Oct 1991	GMB trip to South Africa to explore possibility of commercial imports of white maize.
Nov 1991	NEWU alert of pending drought.  REWU alert to all member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that the drought was widespread and that countries of the region would not be able to provide grain for each other.  Stocks of grain in Zimbabwe dangerously low; risk that they would be inadequate for the annual January-February period of consumption preceding first harvest period; prediction of failure of the harvest due to lack of late year rains.  Government review of the situation and assessment of the risk that stocks might be depleted; decision to honor 1990 commitments to sell maize to Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique.
20 Dec 91	Letter of Commitment for purchase of maize from South Africa approved.
31 Dec 91	Arrival of first shipments of purchase from South Africa.
Jan 1992	Alerts of pending food shortage crisis to AID/Washington by USAID/Zimbabwe
11 Feb 92	Emergency Declaration by U.S. Ambassador

- Feb 1992** SAFER (Southern Africa Foundation for Education and Research) seminar on the developing food and water crisis in Zimbabwe, focused on the food and water situation in Zimbabwe, to identify short and long term solutions to the food and water crisis, and highlight policy weaknesses, revealed that the degree of risk was well known to working level government officials and the private sector.
- Feb 1992** First meeting of donors held by UN Resident Representative at urging of USAID Director.
- 6 Mar 1992** Declaration by Zimbabwe President of a National Disaster and establishment of drought relief Task Force to coordinate and monitor the drought relief and recovery program and mobilize resources.
- Mar 1992** Arrival and prompt distribution of commercial orders of late 1991; cessation of food riots in urban areas.
- Declaration of force majeure and cancellation of agreements for grain exports to other countries of the region (with one exception of 2,000 MT for Botswana).
- Beginning of operations by staff of what was to become the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).
- Mar-Apr 92** Confirmation by FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions to 10 countries of Southern Africa that drought had severely affected crops throughout the region (except in Angola, where food shortages were due mainly to insecurity), with conclusion that a major relief effort was needed to avert massive famine.
- Assessments of logistical needs by WFP in cooperation with SADC REWU and national SADC member systems, and proposal to establish a logistics advisory function in Harare to coordinate information on ship movements, ports, etc.
- 15 Apr 92** Decisions by meeting of SADCC ministers of transport and of agriculture to: 1) establish a regional drought relief task force of representatives from transport and agriculture ministries and national drought relief organizations, to be chaired by Zimbabwe; 2) establish six transport corridor groups, each based on the port offering access to the interior, and chaired by the respective port authority, the whole to be chaired by the Southern Africa Transport Coordination Committee (SATCC); 3) establish a joint SADCC/WFP Logistics Advisory Center



in Harare to coordinate information on transport logistics; and 4) call for a donor conference to seek assistance.

- Apr 1992 Consolidated appeal document drafted at working group meeting in Geneva under auspices of DHA with participation by UN Agencies, World Bank, IMF, NGOs.
- May 1992 SADCC Task Force consultations with DHA leading to joint leadership of donor pledging conference.
- 1-2 Jun 92 Pledging conference, Geneva, reviewed requirements for Targeted Food Aid (to be distributed free), Program Food Aid (for commercial imports) and Non-Food Aid; over 80 percent for food and related logistics in the form of 1.645 million tons of basic food commodities for free distribution; an additional 2.5 million tons of food to be required as program food aid.
- Estimates for Zimbabwe at US\$ 209 million, all but US\$ 21 million for food.
- 15 Jun 92 WFP Area Director in Harare designated as United Nations Regional Coordinator for Logistics and Food Transport, responsible for coordinating all food aid movements and related logistics in the region and for WFP management role in the regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC).

#### *Issues for Future Consideration*

1. What measures would ensure a more prompt response by member governments to early warning by the Regional Early Warning Unit of SADC?
2. How many assessments of the effects of a drought are necessary, and by whom, in order to stimulate internal and external responses?
3. What should be the shape and role of a national food security policy for Zimbabwe?

#### **B. Identification of Vulnerable Groups**

Zimbabwe already had in place a system for identification of drought victims and, since the mid-1980s, had been delivering relief food to up to 500,000 persons during the last part of the growing season (January-March) before the harvest came in, as well as to disabled and destitute persons on an annual basis. This program was administered by the Department of Welfare of the Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare, which maintained a list

of eligible participants. For the broader Drought Relief Program, the government determined that a formal system of registration was needed in order to identify needy persons and households. The objectives of the Program were to ensure that drought relief reached a targeted population in rural districts, alleviate the food crisis affecting under-privileged rural communities, ameliorate the health status of poor rural communities, and ensure that people engaged in some form of secure employment did not benefit at the expense of the under-privileged rural poor. An application form was created, to be filled out by applicants and screened by local officials based on such factors as household subsistence production, other household income, number of wage earners in the family, and health and nutrition status.

The Department of Social Welfare launched a nationwide registration campaign, with the result that by July 1992, 4.5 million persons had been approved for registration. This screening was accomplished in relatively good faith, as far as the administrators of the questionnaires were concerned. However, over-registration was possible, as absent family members returned to their communities and asked to be registered, and the involvement of local development committees or council members, or functionaries of the local majority party cadre, introduced inequities. As the effects of the drought augmented, and people became aware of the availability of relief food, the total number of registrations grew, until it reached 4.8 million persons in August, and 5.6 million (or 54 percent of the total 1992 population of 10.4 million) in November. Neither urban residents nor commercial farm residents were included in the registration campaign.

Recognizing that it was logistically and financially impossible to distribute relief food to such a large number, and having gained approval of a monthly budget for relief based on a lower, interim, number of recipients, the Department organized a second registration in order to weed out those registrants who were not among the most needy. The effort was only marginally successful, as the percentage reduction ranged from about 3 to 10 percent in the various districts of the country. Some individual communities took matters into their own hands, calling upon community workers and extension agents to identify needy households and putting pressure on those holding political position or power to distribute available supplies equitably.

The Department of Social Welfare did not have the staff, knowledge or time to call on the NGOs that are active in rural areas to help introduce equity to the registration lists. Nor, according to NGO representatives, would they have had the time to do a systematic job of screening general relief recipients on behalf of the government. Although, the NGOs did not have a history of working directly in relief programs, they pitched in to respond to the drought, mainly by providing transport of food from district headquarters to rural areas, rehabilitating water points, and managing supplemental food programs. Church organizations receiving food from their own sources overseas usually did their own screening of recipients among their local membership.

A major concern of the Department was that the wide-ranging food distribution program might be short-changing needy families in the more vulnerable areas of the country. The

advent of the FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) of the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. at the Department of Social Welfare in May 1992 brought expertise in data analysis to the problem of identifying vulnerable households. Analyzing data already available to the Central Statistical Office of U.S. the Ministry of Finance, from the just completed August 1992 population census and a longitudinal series of household surveys, FEWS personnel found, for example, that in certain districts the number of persons registered exceeded the number of residents recorded in the census. Putting together production and income data, they were able to identify the worst affected districts of the country for special attention. To provide insight into and gather information on the types of problems being experienced by people living in those most vulnerable areas, a survey was conducted by a Zimbabwe firm, Probe Market Research, in five of those most vulnerable districts over a three-month period, at the height of the emergency, October to December 1992. In each district data was gathered from households in four wards, selected to sample areas with different standards of living and to ensure that an NGO was operating in at least one of the wards. In addition to demographic and household income data, the survey covered such matters as sources of water, quantities of food supply of the past four weeks (the questions were repeated every three weeks during the survey period), crops, livestock, and participation in supplemental food schemes. The overall picture indicated that distress from the drought was indeed serious, but people were receiving food relief (an average of 5.6 kg. per person per month) and, even more importantly, were managing to acquire enough food to sustain themselves. They coped mainly by using monthly cash income still coming in to buy additional maize and supplemental food products.

For the supplemental food programs for children under the age of five (begun in July 1992 under the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare) and for school children in grades 1 through 3 (begun by the Ministry of Education and Culture in December), registration was by group rather than by individual. In any community with at least 15 percent of children having signs of malnutrition according to upper arm measurement, all children under age five would receive food that was intended to be supplemental to their family's regular and relief food. Similarly, certain schools were designated for school feeding, and all children in the lower three grades would receive the supplemental food of the program.

#### ***Issue for Future Consideration:***

How can an objective but simple screening system be designed that can be protected from undue political influence?

#### **C. Transport Logistics**

By February 1992, the Beira Corridor Group (BCG), a private membership organization of producers, shippers, and transport operators dedicated to promoting reliable transport of imports and exports on the shortest route between Zimbabwe and the Indian Ocean port of Beira, was alert to the coming challenge to get sufficient food into Zimbabwe. By March, with support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), BCG had

concluded that the corridor from Beira could double its record and handle one million metric tons of dry bulk food relief commodities for landlocked states in a 12-month period. Further, the Limpopo River corridor from the port of Maputo was deemed capable of handling, at the outside, another half million metric tons.

The staffs of the BCG, SADCC and national railway operators concluded that, in order to meet the requirements of the region as a whole, it would be wise to set up additional "corridor groups" to help expedite transport from other ports to the interior. Responsibility for operations of each corridor would be assigned to the authority managing the port of entry to the corridor. Such a plan was proposed to, and accepted by, the SADCC ministers of transport at a meeting in Lusaka in April 1992. A representative of Spoornet (South Africa Railways) who had been invited to the meeting, conferred informally with his counterparts but was not officially part of the SADCC meeting. Ultimately, six corridor groups were in operation (see Annex B for a description of their role).

Simultaneously, World Food Program and SADCC had been discussing a proposal to set up a logistics advisory center in Harare to keep track of donor shipments, ports of arrival and inland destinations, and to maintain contact with both donor and recipient governments. That proposal was also approved at Lusaka in April.

At the offices of Spoornet in Johannesburg, a Grain Operations Control Center was set up, under an assistant manager as coordinator, for 24-hour clocking and management of the movement of maize imports from ports of entry to final rail destinations in South Africa itself and each of the SADCC member countries. The railways of the landlocked countries each sent representatives to work at the center. The Logistic Advisory Center also sent a staff adviser to Johannesburg to help fulfill its information and coordination function. The general managers of the railways met once a month, the port and other managers of the components of each of the transport corridors met regularly, and working communication among the operators of the various systems took place daily.

To break the bottlenecks at border crossings used for both Zimbabwe and transit goods, some totally new staging and storage systems were initiated. For example, the newly opened rail line from Maputo was used to haul grain only as far as the southeastern dry region of Zimbabwe where the facilities of sugar estates (no longer in operation because of the lack of water for irrigation) could be used for storage until truckers could move the grain to other parts of the country.

To the surprise of some donors, the country had sufficient long distance trucking capacity to move government imports and donations to Grain Marketing Board depots, though shortages of spare parts were severe. A World Bank credit financed the needed spares. Another time, private operators would seek greater safeguards against award of tenders to inexperienced truck owners incapable of carrying out their tasks, and would recommend more decentralized contract authority and more flexible payment procedures in WFP, but there were no major problems. It was in shorter distance hauling that demand exceeded supply, especially as

larger operators were reluctant to expose their vehicles to the bad road conditions of the more remote rural areas. As a result, the costs of transport of food relief were often high.

The government bodies charged with drought relief and supplemental feeding programs had some difficulty obtaining transport to get the food to their many rural distribution points. Eventually they were authorized to tender for private sector transport, but in the early months they had to rely on scarce government-owned vehicles and the good offices of NGOs.

Meanwhile, a telephone network interface system named SAFIRE (Southern Africa Food Information Resource Exchange), designed in A.I.D./Washington, was introduced to the region by the provision of computers, modems and software, together with the training of persons expected to operate an electronic store and forward message system using ordinary telephone lines. SAFIRE was intended to permit the sharing of information by 23 parties identified as involved in regional transport and logistics operations. The agencies were assumed to be able to telephone to the United States even when communication with each other by telephone was not possible. Messages from the various users were picked up by the Washington-based node of the network once a day and passed from there to intended addressees. Ultimately, SAFIRE was not used to its full potential. It was, however, used by the World Food Program staff at the Logistic Advisory Center, who found it an effective system for transmitting data files between its southern African offices and its headquarters in Rome, via the node in the United States.

#### **D. Resources Mobilized**

The success of the response to the drought is attributable in largest measure to the commitment of their own resources by the government and the people of Zimbabwe as well as to the mobilization of external assistance, most notably from World Food Program (WFP) and the United States, for food and assistance in transport logistics. Other UN agencies most actively involved in drought response programs included UNICEF and WHO. The World Bank provided a US\$ 100 million credit for drought-related non-food imports in July 1992, and a credit for the purchase of maize in September 1992.

Mobilization by WFP and the United States was relatively prompt and effective, though each could have made improvements in approval and procurement procedures. Fortunately, because Zimbabwe's own imports had been arriving in adequate quantity, even in spite of the priority that Zimbabwe accorded to transshipment for Malawi in the early months, delays in the arrival of U.S. shipments, and the U.S. contributions through WFP, did not engender life-and-death consequences. Considering the necessity to get U.S. grain to a U.S. port, load and transport it to a South African port, berth and unload the ship (bagging the grain if necessary, as it was for 30 percent of the grain intended for Zimbabwe, and 100 percent for Zambia and Malawi), transport by rail to a depot in Zimbabwe, the shortest theoretically feasible time required would be about two months. The first delivery of PL480 Title I arrived at port four months after signature of the agreement, and in Zimbabwe three weeks later. Food provided under the Section 416 food grant program also arrived in four months, but the longer period

required for berthing and inland transport delayed arrival in Zimbabwe for another two months. Fortunately, the government was able to "lend" commercially purchased maize to the food relief program, but it did not have any sorghum until the U.S. shipment arrived. Thus, it was a full 12 months from the U.S. Ambassador's declaration of disaster to the first free distribution of sorghum to vulnerable households (see Section II of the Chronology in Annex A).

Unfortunately, because the World Bank lacks experience in the international grain markets, there was so great a delay in the orders and delivery of maize that some of the maize was sold by the GMB upon arrival at port. Procurement under the credit for drought management supplies and equipment was also bogged down by the uncompromising nature of the standard procurement regulations of the Bank that were not modified for the emergency response.

The United States provided a massive amount of food assistance to Zimbabwe, and the largest bilateral contribution of non-food aid, through several food aid "spigots" (see table in Annex C). The 672,475 MT of maize provided by the United States represented 27 percent of the total consumption during the drought emergency period of January 1992 through May 1993.

The total consumption of 2,448,840 MT of maize during the drought period originated as follows:

Zimbabwe resources	<u>1,743,000 MT</u>
On-farm production	360,000 MT
Government purchases	1,383,000 MT
U.S. Government sales	<u>670,475 MT</u>
Guar. Sales for Mkg.	177,475 MT
Title I, FY 1992	250,000 MT
Title I, FY 1993	50,000 MT
U.S. Government donations	
Section 416 direct	108,000 MT
Section 416 thru WFP	85,000 MT
Other donors	<u>243,749 MT</u>
European Community	60,000 MT
Australia, thru WFP	8,000 MT
World Bank	175,749 MT
(excludes 70,000 MT sold on arrival at port)	
<b>GRAND TOTAL, Maize</b>	<b>2,657,224 MT</b>

Fully half of total maize imports were financed by Zimbabwe from its own reserves or borrowings, and another 27 percent was provided by donors on credit terms. Thus, only 11 percent of required imports were available to Zimbabwe on grant terms.

Food provided by the United States to Zimbabwe included 177,000 MT of maize under a US\$ 20,000,000 credit guarantee from USDA that also covered internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs. Through a concessional loan under the PL480 Title I program the United States provided 70,000 MT of wheat and 10,860 MT of vegetable oil. Another 58,000 MT of maize and 50,000 MT of sorghum were offered on grant terms under Section 416 of the Agriculture Act.

Commitments of USAID funds from the Southern Africa Regional Program included US\$ 6,900,000 through WFP for logistics coordination and transport operations, US\$ 13,266,588 for leasing of South African locomotives and rail wagons as needed within the region, US\$ 1,160,000 for production of varieties of sorghum and pearl millet that had been adapted to regional conditions, and US\$ 1,100,000 for expertise from UNCTAD to facilitate transport of the emergency grain supplies by identifying bottlenecks to efficient operations and recommending remedial steps.

Through the Regional Program, the United States had provided over \$250 million of assistance to the transport sector of the region in support of the SADC program to improve inter-regional transport links and efficiency. USAID's leadership, funding through existing projects, and special grants to WFP for regional logistics coordination and for relieving logistical bottlenecks were of fundamental importance in this massive relief effort that moved more food (11.5 million tons) to more people, in a shorter period (14 months), to more landlocked countries (6) through more ports (8) by more individuals in the system (60,000 altogether) than ever known to the world.

From A.I.D./Washington, a total of over US\$ two million from OFDA supported water development and food programs in Zimbabwe by UNICEF, Peace Corps, American Red Cross (for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), Africare and Catholic Relief Services. The Africa Bureau provided another US\$ 1,100,000 for drought recovery efforts in water development by Africare. The Famine Early Warning Systems project of the Africa Bureau provided US\$ 1,600,000 in technical assistance to help the Department of Social Welfare target its food relief program. The Ambassador's self help fund, also applied to water projects, totaled over US\$ 300,000.

A total of Z\$ 40,000,000 (equivalent to about US\$ 7.6 million) that had been generated by previous USAID sector support programs in Zimbabwe was identified by the government, with USAID assistance, as available for reprogramming. The funds were used to finance the hiring of 204 additional temporary staff for the Department of Social Welfare's drought relief distribution program and to help the crop pack program of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development that was designed to get fertilizers and seed to small farmers to help them recover from the drought by planting next year's crop in the late rains of 1992.

A further effort financed from regional funds was designed to help four countries of the region (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Namibia) acquire seeds of drought-tolerant small grains to plant at the time of the next rains. This effort drew on the results of USAID's ten

years of support to the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program of the ICRISAT research station located at Matopos in Zimbabwe. With U.S. (US\$ 1,100,000) and Canadian financing, the ICRISAT staff was able to find a suitable location (in southern Zambia, accessible to water from Lake Kariba) for the production of seeds of certain varieties of sorghum and pearl millet that had already been proved to be viable in the growing conditions of the southern African countries. Malawi did not approve the program for national distribution of the seeds to farmers until too late in the rainy season, but the other three countries benefited significantly from the project. The improved and tested varieties matured in a shorter time than traditional small grain seeds, and therefore produced a harvest in the short period available for growing that year.

In Zimbabwe, U.S. maize, wheat and vegetable oil provided on credit terms became part of government stocks, to be utilized through usual commercial channels. U.S. maize provided on a grant basis under Section 416 supplied the relief feeding program for approximately 1.5 million people in the two dry provinces of Masvingo and Mashonaland West in the period October 1992 through March 1993. U.S. sorghum imported under Section 416 was included in the relief distribution system for all provinces in the period February 1993 through April 1993.

At the outset, USAID/Zimbabwe had been active in alerting the U.S. government, other donors and the media to the need for rapid response to the drought situation. It was at USAID's urging, and before the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs had launched its appeal that the incumbent Resident Representative called the first meeting of donors to discuss the situation, review data prepared by the U.S.-supported SADC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU), and coordinate plans.

At USAID's invitation, journalists based in Africa visited Zimbabwe to learn about and report on this drought that was not producing pictures of wasting children, and therefore was not attracting media attention. The United States Information Service maintained and reproduced a monthly volume of clippings from the local and regional press covering the drought.

In May 1992, USAID obtained the services of a team of three technical experts from the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) project of the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. in order to help improve targeting of food relief by the Department of Social Welfare. The team developed maps to identify the most vulnerable geographic areas of the country and conducted a field review of household income and accessibility to food in five administrative districts identified as among the most vulnerable of the country. The FEWS work enabled the Department to conclude that its food ration was adequate, even in the worst affected areas, because households had other food or financial resources to obtain food.

In order to be able to continue with its regular bilateral and regional program management and at the same time to organize and manage drought relief programs, as well as to direct relevant elements of the Southern Africa Regional Program toward alleviation of future drought-related disasters, USAID/Zimbabwe expanded its staff resources on a temporary



basis. Expertise brought to post included a retired A.I.D. agricultural specialist experienced in drought disaster management to monitor the food aid, an A.I.D. officer experienced in food aid to help draft and negotiate agreements, and a transport logistics adviser. Two members of the American community in Zimbabwe worked as a Drought Information Team to manage an information and reporting system, prepare and maintain a rolling and up-to-date briefing book for internal and external use, and carry out field monitoring functions. The FEWS project provided three persons to work at the Department of Social Welfare to help them refine the targeting of food distribution.

Outside of the United States, the international community, in general, was not prepared to respond "officially" to the drought in Zimbabwe until after President Mugabe's declaration of a National Disaster on 6 March 1992. Beginning from that time, and more intensely following the UN-sponsored Appeal meeting in June, bilateral aid agencies (particularly CIDA and EC) and multilateral donors began to organize their response.

### **III. Implementation of the Response**

#### **A. Government of Zimbabwe**

Although it was July 1991 when Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development officials expressed their concern about the status of grain stocks, based on their own observations and the regular quarterly report of the Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU), it was not until 6 March 1992 that the government declared a National Disaster. Then things moved quickly.

The President established a national drought relief Task Force, chaired by one of the country's two vice presidents, with six multi-sectoral action subcommittees at national level, each chaired by the Minister of the most relevant line ministry, and similar subcommittees at provincial and district levels. The full Task Force met initially, but did not meet formally very often afterward, mainly because government officials saw the need to act quickly and were prepared to take decisions, or to take their issues to the cross-sectoral subcommittees for decision.

These national subcommittees of the Task Force varied in the breadth of their roles and their effectiveness. The regular weekly meetings of the transport subcommittee became lively work sessions, where problems were raised, conflicts resolved and actions decided. Private sector representatives were a central part of the action, and meetings were open to any interested or active party. Other especially active committees were those for procurement, and for national action on water and power.

Most programs, however, were carried out effectively by existing structures, which needed to turn to a higher level subcommittee when matters to be coordinated with other ministries were complex or when they needed support for a request for an allocation of funds by the Ministry

of Finance. The Drought Relief subcommittee, for example, had jurisdiction over the food relief program carried out by the Department of Social Welfare and the two supplemental feeding programs, one for children under the age of five through the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, and one for primary school children in grades one through three through the Ministry of Education and Culture. The most important issues for the subcommittee concerned the allocation of budget for the personnel and food inputs required for each of these programs. Food was supplied by World Food Program to each of the programs, and UNICEF and WHO provided other, non-food, assistance from UNICEF and WHO for the supplemental schemes. The Department of Social Welfare, however, had to present its requirements for grains from the stocks of the Grain Marketing Board to the Task Force subcommittee.

The Drought Relief Program itself involved basically two components: one of food handouts for disabled persons, children and the aged, another for able bodied individuals who could undertake productive food for work activities. The Department of Social Welfare and Agritex (the agricultural extension system) took the primary action in identification, registration and screening of targeted beneficiaries. The Grain Marketing Board was responsible for maintaining stocks of maize. The Central Mechanical Equipment Department and managers of the various District Development Funds were responsible for transporting maize to distribution centers and maintenance of the fleet. Distribution to the targeted beneficiaries was carried out by local government councilors with assistance from local chiefs and village development committee leaders who knew the people and their general welfare status. The district offices of the Department submitted weekly returns to their provincial offices indicated the amount of supplies distributed and the amounts needed for each distribution point. This system enabled the provincial offices to estimate requirements for each month and submit their needs to the Grain Marketing Board on a timely basis.

The Distribution subcommittee chaired by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development was charged with allocations of grain to millers for commercial sales and to the Department of Social Welfare for relief programs.

When the first imports of maize arrived from South Africa in March 1992, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and Department of Social Welfare moved quickly to get the grain to the districts and to consumers. The GMB saw to it that grain was unloaded from rail and road transport to its 72 depots, and that it was moved promptly to depots in areas of greatest need. The Department established a special staff, headed and staffed by personnel seconded from the Department itself, to identify drought victims and organize distribution of relief food from the GMB depots.

An additional administrative burden was imposed by the government's decision that relief food would not be offered on a "handout" basis, but that all able-bodied persons would be required to participate in local food for work activity. Some food for work projects were fundamentally relevant to community recovery from the drought, as for example rehabilitation or establishment of dams, wells and boreholes. Others were poorly designed or executed

projects or less developmentally significant old favorites of local politicians. And in some cases a local government or community was too hard pressed to react to the food crisis to organize food for work. On balance, however, the food for work policy was effective in promoting recovery and preparing for alleviation of future emergencies.

In July 1992, a Child Supplemental Feeding Program began for children under the age of five through the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare with assistance from WHO and UNICEF in management and logistics and from food donors. The ration of maize, groundnuts, beans and vegetable oil was intended to be supplemental to the food the child might receive at home, either from household stocks and purchases or from relief distributions. The program was implemented at 21,595 feeding points, where Ministry officials, community workers and mothers prepared food for 1,066,000 children at peak attendance. Some 20 NGOs accounted for ten percent of the coverage.

Bulk food received from donors was re-packaged into 10 kg food pack containing a ration for 10 individuals for one month based on feeding seven days a week (the actual frequency was often only five days). These packs were broken down in turn by the relief workers and assisting mothers who prepared a "wet" or cooked meal. Participation in the program fell off in late 1992, as mothers stayed home to plant and cultivate, taking advantage of the new rains and the recovery program seed packs that had been distributed. Attendance picked up again in January.

The School Supplemental Feeding Program, under the Ministry of Education and Culture, did not begin until December 1992, when it was apparent that children were staying away from school because of hunger and weakness, were falling asleep at school and were not able to absorb classroom lessons. In addition to the government program, those of about 10 NGOs covered an additional 800 schools. In addition to its late start, the program suffered from lack of internal institutional capacity—all secretariat posts were donor funded—and by delays, as in acquiring the necessary budgetary funds and in accessing WFP food.

### ***Issues for Future Consideration***

1. Can, or should a relief program discriminate among:
  - members of a household,
  - age groups,
  - members of a school, or school class, or
  - members of a community?
2. When budget considerations threaten to limit the amount of relief food available, how can factors of nutritional status and household income be used to help determine the size of ration to be offered?

3. How can the risk that the implementation of multiple work and feeding programs is inefficient or redundant be balanced against a) the need for speedy initial reaction or b) the advantages of using existing institutions and systems?

## **B. Multilateral Organizations**

Once the Appeal for southern Africa had been launched, DHA appointed a director of the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA). DESA tracked the donor response to the appeal, the funding committed for the various UN agency projects and the quantities destined for each distressed country. Another of its functions was to screen the projects proposed by UN agencies for their applicability to the drought emergency.

The UNDP Resident Representative, as designated coordinator of the UN agency response in the country, chaired bi-weekly meetings of donors to discuss progress and identify areas for coordination. WFP and USAID were the key contributors of information, on movements of food and transport logistics and steps being taken to break bottlenecks. Among UN agencies, UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR found the meetings particularly useful for keeping up with WFP's activities and organizing joint or cooperative actions. Government representatives attended on occasion when a subject of particular interest to them was to be discussed.

The FAO was responsible for the initial estimates of basic food grain needs on behalf of the UN system on which the UN/SADC appeal of June 1992 was based. Outside of its continuing work through the SADC early warning project, FAO had no further operational responsibility in response to the drought. Their estimate for Zimbabwe of 1,100,000 MT as of March 1992 was consistent with the estimate of the Regional Early Warning Unit and was relied on by OFDA team that followed them. Unfortunately, however, when the import requirement increased, ultimately rising to 2,400,000 MT, FAO had no means of updating its figure for Zimbabwe, with the result that some observers and donors thought that Zimbabwe's needs had been met.

The decision was taken, at the time of the June 1992 UN Appeal, that WFP would take the lead in food aid operations. The organization has fully justified the confidence it was given by participants at the Appeal meeting, in keeping track of pledges and movement of food commodities donated for free distribution (the so-called target food aid), in organizing the coordination of information on donor shipments and transport logistics from the Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare and Operations Center in Johannesburg, in managing the US funds provided to help break logistical bottlenecks and in organizing an account of total food donations.

The LAC was funded by a grant from USAID to WFP, with a SADCC nominee and WFP's Zimbabwe program director as co-directors. The Center promptly began to coordinate logistical information, but was handicapped in its other functions by continuing delays in

procurement due to the reluctance of the head office in Rome to delegate procurement authority to the LAC. The second WFP officer installed as full time co-director of LAC was able to break some of the bottlenecks and to acquire expanded authority, but the problem was not totally resolved.

A WFP report as of 22 March 1993 indicates it had organized the following:

- 69,557 MT of maize, groundnuts, beans and oil to government for the Child Supplementary Feeding Program from ten donors (including 13,647 MT from the United States;
- 83,255 MT of food donations from 22 donor country-based NGOs for the School Supplementary Feeding Program; and
- 191,040 MT of maize and sorghum from the United States and Australia (a swap of 5,400 MT in WFP reserves for 8,040 MT of maize) as donations to the government drought relief program.

UNCTAD sent a team of two experts to the various rail and road facilities and transit points in the region to observe whether there were bottlenecks and recommend solutions (see Section D, below).

The UNICEF office in Harare was a very strong player in the response. With funds from its general budget, from the United States (OFDA), and from other donors, UNICEF provided staff, technical expertise, equipment and vehicles to help the Department of Social Welfare, the Ministries of Health and Child Welfare and of Education and Culture in their drought relief management responsibilities, as well as to help the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development plan and implement its US\$ 50 million program to alleviate water shortages. A U.S. grant of US\$ 950,000 was used to carry out a number of small water projects to contain or reduce the need for migration in search of water.

WHO was active in promoting and implementing the Child Supplementary Feeding Program that was finally initiated in December 1992, and has evaluated the success of the program, which is continuing throughout 1993 using vegetable oil, beans and peanuts that were excess to the strictly drought related needs.

### **C. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

Non-Governmental Organizations are reported to have been responsible for distributing 13 percent (24,000 MT) of the food relief program, a good portion of the child supplemental feeding program and 45 percent of the school supplemental feeding program. Thus, NGOs made a substantial contribution to the response to the drought in spite of their general

orientation to development activities and lack of experience is disaster management. Not only were they able to help with the general tasks of transport and distribution of food relief, but they were also effective in reaching some of the more remote rural areas. Because of the developmental and community-oriented philosophies of the majority of the NGOs involved, their interventions tended to include training, rehabilitation and development of water resources and agricultural recovery activities.

The approach to organization of NGOs was unlike that of the 1982/83 drought, when VOICE, which was then the umbrella organization for international and local NGOs, took the lead in food distribution, and apparently was less effective. At that time, the role of the government in drought relief had not yet been developed, and dependence on NGOs was essential. In response to the drought of 1982, VOICE established a Drought Operations Committee to implement nationwide food distribution and supplementary feeding of children under five years of age. The Committee operated with a small staff of persons experienced in social work, denominational social and developmental programs and the operations of international and local NGOs. The Committee raised funds from USAID and other external donors, managed the deployment of donated vehicles, and allocated geographic areas for attention by particular NGOs. New information on the location of needy people and inequities in distribution of relief food was brought to the attention of NGO representatives at regular monthly meetings where issues were resolved.

**Local NGOS.** In 1990, after VOICE had ceased functioning, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO) of Zimbabwe was formed. Membership was restricted to local NGOs, of which there are over 600. NANGO is a loose association dedicated mainly to information sharing, and is not strong in coordination. The majority of its members are small and focused on small scale religious or development activities. The Drought Relief and Rehabilitation Committee it set up in 1992 under the leadership of a representative of an international NGO to coordinate operations did not have nearly the effectiveness of the 1982/83 Committee. Some planning and information sharing meetings were held, but these were poorly attended.

The Department of Social Welfare did turn to NANGO, and in particular to its more active constituent members, for assistance in carrying out the government's basic program of food distribution and, in the later drought recovery stage, distribution of the seeds and fertilizer to be used by farmers when the rains began again. Following a long meeting chaired by the Acting Director of the Department in August 1992, a number of NGOs became actively involved. Using vehicles available to them and their own staff, they were able to get food and crop packs out to more isolated communities in areas of their membership constituency. The availability of vehicles was particularly important because it was not until January 1993 that the Department obtained authority to issue tenders for contracts with private transporters. Ultimately, cooperation agreements were concluded between the Department and nine local NGOs and CARE International, Africare and Save the Children Federation UK.

The Department was concerned by the lack of willingness of some NGOs to stay in close communication, or to follow its guidelines for eligibility for food, but did not achieve a means of more effective coordination. After their first meeting, coordination between the central government and the active NGOs remained weak, though it was better at provincial and district levels. The Department and its representatives were frustrated by their lack of knowledge as to whether, for instance, a community was receiving more than the approved rations through the NGO alone or through double deliveries of food by government and an NGO.

The mutual lack of communication is illustrated by the response of provincial representatives at a Department of Social Welfare meeting to review its drought relief response held in April 1993. Only three of the eight representatives offered the information on NGO involvement expected in the reports presented. In Midlands Province, one of profoundly affected provinces, known NGOs were: the Association of Women's Clubs for community gardens and identification of trained women to help in child feeding; the Red Cross in child feeding; and Save the Children Federation U.K. in transport of drought relief and seed packs. In Mashonaland Province, the only report was of Norwegian People's Aid in food distribution in one of the five most affected districts of the country. In Masvingo Province, one of the worst affected, food, transport, seeds, child feeding, livestock and well digging were provided by Catholic Development Commission, Christian Care and a number of denominational missions, Heifer Project International, Oxfam, Plan International, Redd Barna and Red Cross.

The members of NANGO have met to review their experience and consolidate their views on their contribution to drought relief and recovery. They have two major concerns. First, they recognize that they did not have access to sufficient staff or other human resources to carry out their share of responsibility and will require training in emergency response before participating in another major effort. Second, they are determined that in future they will be sensitive, in their development activities, to the need to include programs that will lead to alleviation of the effects of future droughts, activities in such areas as water, development of community leadership, and diversification to appropriate agricultural crops as well as facilitation of off-farm income generation.

At its review workshop in April 1993, the Department of Social Welfare described the contributions it had foreseen from NGOs as follows:

- coordination and provision of food, transport and/or management personnel for a particular district, using DSW procedures;
- provision of skilled manpower to assist DSW in management of food distributions; and
- identification and technical supervision of projects, including supply of material inputs provided from their own resources or those obtained through DSW.

In retrospect the Department has concluded that in most cases, efforts were not sufficiently coordinated, with the result that there was some duplication of service, the scale of food

ration varied, and efforts were overly concentrated in certain districts. Coordination improved slightly in the case of NGOs needing access to WFP and USAID food and CIDA funds that had been made available to DSW. Organizations such as Save the Children Federation, to whom certain districts were assigned by DSW headquarters, found that at provincial level they could redefine their assignment to concentrate on certain parts of a district in which they already had contacts (and were therefore more effective in identifying needy households) or which they knew to be particularly distressed.

Both the government and the NGOs recognize that the latter have a particular ability to contribute deriving from their experience in working in marginal or variable environments; knowledge of the economic and social circumstances of their constituencies; capacity to target interventions using effective participatory community-level approaches; less bureaucratic organizational structures and operational procedures; and ability to mobilize and use resources more flexibly than governments. The challenge to both sides in a future emergency will be one mainly of organization, mutual agreement on guidelines, and effective operational coordination without sacrificing the advantages of the NGOs. In the longer term, NGOs will continue to play a significant role in helping households and communities achieve food security through production, improved storage and processing, attention to the role of women, and gains in income.

**International NGOs.** By mid-1992, NANGO had invited representatives of the international NGOs that are active in Zimbabwe to the regular coordination meetings. Those most active were:

Africare, in emergency water supplies for three of the driest provinces of Zimbabwe

Catholic Relief Services, in food, seeds and water through two well established Zimbabwe community development oriented organizations, Catholic Development Commission and Organization of Rural Associations for Progress

Zimbabwe Red Cross and the regional office of International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), in supplementary feeding, Vitamin A supplements, water and sanitation materials, mobilization of volunteers for food distribution and preparation in two provinces

Save the Children Federation U.S., in supplementary feeding and rehabilitation and development of wells and boreholes

World Vision Relief and Development (rehabilitation of wells and boreholes)



**Direct Support to NGO Activities by USAID.** In 1992, when the USAID Director first called a meeting with U.S.-based NGOs to discuss their potential role in response to the drought emergency, none except World Vision Relief and Development (which was active in Zimbabwe's camps for Mozambican refugees) expressed any interest in involvement in direct food relief activities. Their established, and geographically focused, programs were developmental in nature. The international NGOs in Zimbabwe had not been involved in distribution of food grants in Zimbabwe, because U.S. food grains had historically been provided only under GSM sales, Section 416 grants or PL 480 Title I credits and the government's food relief program was carried out entirely by the Department of Social Welfare. They were more interested in drought amelioration projects, such as water development, which would complement on-going rural development activities. As the crisis progressed, however, these NGOs were prepared to respond to government requests for transport and other food distribution activities to the extent of their ability and carried out emergency water development activities supported by USAID.

Grants from OFDA and the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. supported relief and development work as follows:

In May 1992, US\$ 3,068,000 from OFDA to the American Red Cross for the work of the IFRC in the Southern Africa region, of which US\$ 144,000 was for Zimbabwe for: relief (supplementary feeding, Vitamin A supplement, water and sanitation materials, no overhead); mobilization and training of volunteers in two provinces to support drought relief efforts at ward and district levels.

In August 1992, US\$ 1,501,892 from OFDA for Africare for the Emergency Water Supplies for Drought-Stricken Southern Africa project of which US\$ 443,951 was for Matabeleland North and South Provinces of Zimbabwe, to build on Africare's existing water activities to strengthen local capacity to continue developing more reliable water sources by training and equipping six water teams for six large districts to construct wells, and to deepen and rehabilitate existing wells.

In October 1992, US\$ 1,102,000 from the Africa Bureau for Africare, for a more development-oriented project to construct new wells, boreholes and dams in Masvingo, Midlands, and Manicaland Provinces of Zimbabwe.

In November 1992, US\$ 920,953 to Catholic Relief Service for grain seeds, vegetable seeds, and the emergency water program.

Save the Children Federation U.S. and World Vision Relief and Development were also active in food distribution and water, but operated without specific additional grants from A.I.D.

The experience of the NGOs in organizing transport and equipment varied. They all faced the issue of the high cost of commercial transport. Catholic Relief Service found that a

vehicle could be imported within one month's time, and would pay for itself within six months. Save the Children was able to find sufficient rural transport from local vehicle owners willing to go out on rural roads. And IFRC drew on the generosity and equipment of commercial farmers for help in moving earth for dams.

#### ***Issues for Future Consideration***

1. The need to help the Zimbabwe government and both local and international NGOs get together more promptly and more effectively to identify coordinated roles in response to disaster.
2. The desirability of broadening the definitions of relief and recovery to include steps toward future alleviation of the effects of disaster.

#### **D. Regional Logistics Management**

Following the assessments of logistical needs for food relief in the region in cooperation with SADCC and the Regional Early Warning Unit in March and April 1992, and a decision by the SADCC ministers of transport and of agriculture, the joint WFP-SADCC Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) was established to facilitate the smooth flow of food imports into the region with as little disruption as possible to the region's transport systems and regular commercial trade. With the support of USAID funding, the center began operations in June.

The LAC did not have a mandate to control the timing or routing of shipments but served an essential role in providing information to donors, SADC governments, shipping agents, contractors and transport operators that enabled them to make decisions to ensure prompt delivery of food. The first monthly bulletin of LAC was published in May 1993, and its last in June 1993. The reports included information reports, notices of important events in the region relevant to the drought response and tables summarizing the status of target food aid (with data from DESA in Geneva on food needs and pledges, and its own delivery and pipeline information) and of program food aid (based on its own data and that of the WFP Resources Division in Rome). The World Food Program director of the LAC also handled the grants from USAID and other donors to finance equipment needed to break transportation bottlenecks.

After the end of operations under joint SADC/WFP direction, the LAC reverted to the SADC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit. Financed by the African Development Bank, an adviser will help expand the capacity of the UNIT to cover logistical information and data on international and regional grain price structures and will also advise on policies to establish strategic grain reserves.

The inter-ministerial subcommittee on transport of Zimbabwe met once a week to review progress, hear issues, and propose solutions. The meetings were open to any party interested

in helping get food into Zimbabwe, and through Zimbabwe to Malawi, and were truly working meetings. The subcommittee decided, for example, to give each trucker hauling grain a disk to display to indicate the need for quick passage at the border. When the passports of Zimbabwean truckers expired, the department of immigration set up an expedited system for renewal. In part as a result of studies by experts from UNCTAD, also financed by USAID, border posts were kept open for longer hours and other changes were made to speed the passage of the food.

#### **E. Monitoring and Evaluation**

On the whole, monitoring during the course of drought relief and recovery operations was exemplary. Post drought evaluation and forward planning, Moreover, were well beyond expectation.

**Monitoring by USAID.** In accordance with established procedural guidelines set forth in Handbook 8, USAID/Zimbabwe transmitted its Food Aid Management Plan to A.I.D./Washington in September 1992, following signatures of agreements for GSM, Section 416 and PL480 Title I shipments to Zimbabwe. The plan is recorded in cable number 011138 from Harare of 30 September 1992.

Governments and operators of the region already had a number of well-established monitoring systems. An international maritime surveillance firm, Caleb & Brett, had a contract with Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board to monitor all grain arrivals at South African and Mozambican ports. USAID received copies of all reports from that firm and used the arrival figures as the base figure to monitor arrivals into Zimbabwe.

To verify the arrival of food grain and vegetable oil shipped from the United States, USAID/Zimbabwe executed a contract with Deloitte and Touche of Zimbabwe, through which it was able to verify that 98.6 percent of the U.S. maize arrived in Zimbabwe (a verification figure within 95 to 100 percent is considered good). Because the maize provided under the GSM and PL480 Title I programs were to be put into the commercial system, no further monitoring of maize from those sources was required. Shipments and arrivals were reported by cable weekly from USAID between September 1992 and June 1993.

To verify delivery by the Department of Social Welfare to recipients of the maize and sorghum that was brought into Zimbabwe under the Section 416 grant program, USAID executed a contract with DSS Consultancy (Development Support Services) of Zimbabwe, which filed weekly reports from October 1992 through May 1993 tracking the distribution of a total of 108,000 MT of maize and sorghum. Overall, the surveys found that the Department had organized a well structured system for the registration and screening of beneficiaries and the actual distribution of food to the designated persons, though it was handicapped by shortages of transport and storage, some thefts, lack of impartiality on the part of some local leaders, and lack of staff and transport capacity to monitor the program to ensure its

continued operational efficiency. The system was, however, generally effective in ensuring that food got to the needy people of rural areas. Food was found generally to be available in most of the rural areas in all provinces receiving the U.S. foods, both at GMB depots and in the local shops, where it was available to those who could afford to purchase grain meal. The late arrival of sorghum, in the third week of January 1993, put extra pressure on the Department to move it quickly out of overladen GMB depots. The sorghum had not been fully distributed when the drought was declared officially ended, and the drought relief distribution was terminated. Thus, the final distribution among the provinces was uneven.

The kinds of problem identified by the DSS survey included faults in identification of beneficiaries, unfair and politically motivated registrations, inadequate storage facilities, and a few thefts. USAID passed the weekly reports to the Department of Social Welfare for follow-up action as appropriate. Most problems were resolved.

To assess the validity of the vulnerability indicators used by the Department of Social Welfare, with the advice of the FEWS advisers, and evaluate the effectiveness of the drought relief program in five districts found to be most vulnerable to distress from the drought, USAID financed a survey in those five districts by a Zimbabwe firm, Probe Market Research (Pvt) Ltd. The survey was conducted in at 120 households of four wards in each district selected to sample differing standards of living and to include at least one ward in which an NGO was operating. Key areas of investigation included sources of income, society memberships, access to water, food supplies of the past four weeks (surveyed three times during November-December 1992), status of crops and livestock, access to relief maize, and participation by children in supplementary feeding programs, and by adults in food for work projects.

USAID conducted periodic site visits to observe activities financed by the 1992 OFDA and Africa Bureau grants to NGOs in Zimbabwe and completed an evaluative field review in April and May 1993.

**Monitoring by A.I.D./Washington.** In response to a Technical Proposal submitted by KPMG Peat Marwick on 1 September 1992, A.I.D./Washington executed a contract for full scale review of: a) the accounting and monitoring systems of consignees of U.S. food aid; b) the systems established to meet the accountability requirements and fiduciary responsibilities defined in the food aid agreements; and c) the USAID Food Aid Management Plan. The contractor also was to perform spot checks on movements of commodities and report logistical bottlenecks to efficient movement of the food aid. This work, which was originally proposed in June 1992, to apply to all recipients of food assistance in the region, ultimately began only in Zimbabwe, in October 1992. Because the contract was terminated before completion of its task, the contract team was able to record notes from interviews referring to accounting and monitoring systems, but did not verify those systems through independent observation. The team notes, delivered to USAID in March 1993 in case they might be useful for future reference, were not used by the mission for management of this particular drought relief effort. The staff of USAID/Zimbabwe was fully knowledgeable of, and

confident in, the public and private sector control systems in use in Zimbabwe, and had already established all the additional monitoring procedures that were called for by USAID regulation and prudent management.

**Evaluation.** All actors, governmental and private, have made an effort to report how the response to the drought was organized and brought to a satisfactory conclusion, with emphasis on lessons to be learned for the future (see Section IV of Annex A).

The special seed multiplication effort has been reviewed by the project director, the impact has been assessed by a staff economist and the lessons to be learned have been analyzed by an ICRISAT headquarters team.

Africare has completed an evaluation of its A.I.D.-funded regional emergency water supply project that was to provide emergency water supplies to about 260,000 inhabitants of drought-stricken rural communities in selected provinces of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Other NGOs working on water projects shared some of the same operational experience as Africare in Zimbabwe. Effective, and cost-saving approaches were found to be those that were aligned with the efforts of provincial and local bodies and built upon their existing plans and commitment. Thus, Africare participated on local water and sanitation subcommittees, involved the community in providing labor and materials, and provided trained direction and needed inputs (especially transport) as promptly as possible. In Zimbabwe, the use of local labor, dynamite and simple tools to deepen and rehabilitate existing wells was particularly successful; of 300 wells, 35 remained dry even after deepening; only 15 collapsed. The digging of these wells was accomplished on an emergency basis, without rehabilitation of associated structures. The building of dams, creation of new wells and drilling of boreholes in the water development project funded by the Africa Bureau, however, a basic development effort aimed at future mitigation of a drought crisis, was carried out with heavier equipment and in accordance with government standards of construction, yield and chlorination.

The evaluators found that the division of activities between those considered to be relief, funded by OFDA, and those considered to be developmental, funded by the Africa Bureau became an artificial distinction in terms of the NGO's organization, management and reporting, as both components were active during the same time period, but each required separate reporting. The distinction also complicated USAID oversight of the effort. Unfortunately, the conditions of the appropriations for foreign disaster assistance and for development in Africa, if not changed, will continue to cause perplexity and to complicate the management and reporting burden on NGOs. Thus, the evaluation team itself observed that it would have been desirable to give more attention to environmental hygiene around the water points and include health education in each local project. Such recommendations, unfortunately, cannot be followed except through follow-on development projects.

Other NGOs that have looked back or have a study underway include NANGO, EURONAIID, IFRC and Oxfam.

Among the UN organizations that have held or planned workshops and reported on their contributions to the effort are DHA, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. Studies on special subjects cover such topics as household and community coping mechanisms, targeting of assistance, economic impacts of drought and options for mitigation.

The Logistic Advisory Center and Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit of SADC have published their assessment of the response to the drought.

In the Zimbabwe government, prominent reviewers include the Department of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, and the Province of Masvingo. A government white paper is also in preparation.

## **IV. Outcomes**

### **A. Effectiveness of the Response**

**Transport.** Never before has so much food been moved through so many ports in such a short time to a landlocked country and its neighbors. Together, the 10 SADC countries and South Africa had experienced a bigger crop failure than the Horn of Africa in the mid-1980s. Roughly five times more food (both donated food and commercial imports) than was shipped to the Horn during the 1984/85 famine was brought to the region during the 15 months, April 1992 to June 1993. Usually a net food exporter, the Southern Africa region imported 11.6 million MT of food at an estimated food and transport cost of US\$ 4,000,000,000. This volume, a six-fold increase above normal imports, was added to existing transport flows.

To bring such an immense amount of food into 11 countries, six of them landlocked, through a total of six Indian Ocean ports whose logistical systems had been export oriented, and over long overland rail and road routes, involved some complex and daunting challenges and strains on the regional transport system.

The challenges were met, not without hitches, but without elemental distortions or breakdowns. In Lusaka, in April 1992, the SADCC ministers of transport and of agriculture had decided to:

- 1) establish a regional drought relief task force of representatives from transport and agriculture ministries and national drought relief organizations, to be chaired by Zimbabwe;
- 2) establish six transport corridor groups, each based on the port offering access to the interior, and chaired by the respective port authority, the whole to be chaired by the Southern Africa Transport Coordination Committee (SATCC);
- 3) establish a Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare to coordinate information on transport logistics; and
- 4) call for a donor conference to seek assistance.

These four regional decisions were implemented with extraordinarily beneficial effect for the region as a whole, including Zimbabwe, which was the destination of 2.4 million MT of the maize imports, 160,000 MT of soybeans, 69,000 MT of sorghum and 10,000 tons of vegetable oil.

The LAC compiled and shared regional information on drought relief procurement, importation, distribution and shortfalls, as well as the flows of food that the procurement effort was delivering. The operators of the Grain Operations Control Center in Johannesburg told the evaluation team that they relied on LAC information to know what donor shipments

were on the seas and headed for the various Indian Ocean ports. With funds from donors, including the United States, Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, UK, Luxembourg and African Development Bank, the LAC was able to eliminate bottlenecks to transport in SADC countries. It was able to buy, lease, or borrow equipment; install communication and signalling systems; repair rail wagons and tracks; buy stacking machines, weighing scales, tarpaulins, radios and fax machines; and repair and maintain roads and bridges. The improvements made will contribute to the continued viability of the transport systems.

Political changes and progress in rebuilding the ports of Beira and Maputo in Mozambique, and rehabilitation of the railways of the region were timely for the success of the relief effort. The leadership of Renamo in Mozambique guaranteed a safe zone three kilometers on either side of the rail and road corridor from Beira, as Zimbabwe withdrew the troops that had been protecting traffic. At Beira port, the capacity to handle container cargo had just been doubled, and bulk discharge equipment from Belgium had just been installed. The railways, which had benefited from large infusions of donor-financed equipment, were beginning to give heed to donor pressures for improvements in efficiency. During the drought they streamlined systems: introducing efficiencies from organization of unit trains, each pulling all wagons to a single destination; allowing locomotives to pull trains across the border to an off-loading point rather than handing off to the other country's locomotives at the border; and achieving savings through faster turnaround of rail wagons even if they had to return empty.

One of the most acute areas of periodic bottleneck was the border crossing from South Africa into Zimbabwe at Beitbridge, which carried traffic for Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Botswana. To help alleviate such bottlenecks, among the LAC-organized efforts, financed by USAID, was one to facilitate agreement between Zimbabwe and South Africa that the latter's locomotives would cross the border to GMB depots combined with the purchase and setting up of bagging equipment to speed unloading of the trains at the depots (Zimbabwe wanted to avoid the usual delays that would have caused them to have to lease the locomotives for at least 24 hours).

Procedural changes were made following the recommendations of two studies by USAID-financed UNCTAD transport experts, one on the effect of border procedures on movement of goods by road, the other on interchange arrangements of railways with the ports, at borders and at off-loading points. Decisions on recommendations made by the experts were taken at high level meetings of the regional Transport and Logistics Committee set up to expedite drought relief following technical meetings on road problems in August 1992, and on rail problems in November 1992. In the meantime, operating personnel had made adjustments on their own. If lighting was available, for example, a border post would be kept open as long as the counterpart post in the adjacent country.

For movements by road, where the principal obstacles to efficient movement were bureaucratic in nature, some progress was made; for example, opening hours on both sides of a border were synchronized, or inspection procedures were speeded up. Neither outside advisers nor negotiations by officials of their neighbors dissuaded the Mozambicans from



imposing a number of road and border fees, however. The major problems for the railways were operational, and concerned mainly the utilization of wagons. Following the principle introduced by the experts, that a reduction in turnaround time of as little as five percent would greatly reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of the drought relief effort, some railway managers were persuaded to permit wagons to return empty—an unprecedented move.

The weekly shipping bulletin issued by LAC contained up-to-date, detailed information on all drought-related shipments (commodities, volume, nominated port, arrival and discharge dates, etc.). On the basis of this information, purchasers of shipments were able to decide, for example, whether a ship should be diverted to an alternative port. The port of Beira in Mozambique, being the closest to landlocked Zimbabwe and least costly for Zambia and Malawi, was often overloaded. Moreover, the Mozambican government imposed a number of transport taxes and border levies that raised the price of transport to the interior. Thus, the LAC information enabled consideration of the alternatives between demurrage charges at the overloaded port or transfer of a ship to an alternative port.

Other factors contributing to the transport success included the following:

- the status of road and rail infrastructures, which were in relatively good shape, thanks to heavy infusions of donor aid. (exceptions were the Benguela railway from the Atlantic port of Lobito, which was not operational to the interior, and the route from Nacala in Mozambique to Malawi, for which the rail line had recently been repaired, but the port was not in good working order);
- the unprecedented mutual cooperation between representatives of SADC countries and the public and private sectors of South Africa;
- the mutual confidence and close working relationships between the Government of Zimbabwe and the country's well developed business sector;
- the lack of interference by governments or donors in transport operating decisions;
- the established working level relationships among rail and port operators and shippers of the region (including those in South Africa); and
- the sheer good luck that rains did not interrupt operations at the ports;

**Food Distribution.** In Zimbabwe itself, the dedicated efforts of ministry personnel were supplemented by donor-funded temporary employees, and supported by high level civil servants in key positions who were ready and willing to make quick decisions within the realm of their regular responsibilities. Problems involving more than one ministry were taken to the weekly meetings of the cross-sectoral subcommittees of the Vice President's Drought Relief Task Force for decision and assignment of action. As a result, this overall internal

effort also broke all records. The magnitude of the demand for relief was startling, but was met.

- In a fifteen-month period, the government had to import 2,400,000 MT of maize, the staple subsistence food, to supplement the meager 360,000 MT of 1991 production.\*
- The Grain Marketing Board dispersed 425,304 MT of relief food through 72 depots in urban and rural locations.
- The Department of Social Welfare moved the food from GMB depots to some 2,600 distribution sites. From these sites, with the help of NGOs for one-eighth of the amount, the Department distributed food to an average of 4.5 million persons each month from September 1992 through April 1993, managing to meet the peak demand of 5.1 million in November.
- The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, with assistance from UN agencies, community workers and the mothers of needy children, fed over one million children under the age of five from July 1992.
- The Ministry of Education and Culture, with assistance from UNICEF and Zimbabwean NGOs as well as community workers and mothers, provided a supplemental meal at school to some 300,000 pupils in grades one to three.

A review workshop conducted by the Department of Social Welfare attributed the success of the Drought Relief Program to:

- the participation of communities themselves, in identifying the needy, unloading vehicles, providing storage and security, distribution of grain and supervision of food for work projects;
- the strong commitment of the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) staff; and
- inter-ministerial coordination and cooperation; the regular meetings on operational problems at provincial and district level; the constructive consultation between DSW and GMB;

Weaknesses were identified as:

- the late official declaration of disaster leading to the slow response; and
- inadequate staff and equipment for the Department.

**Food for Work.** The food for work program, in which all able-bodied recipients of relief were supposed to participate, was a mixed success. It was intended not only as a vehicle to get food to needy persons, but also to discourage dependency on government assistance, and to mobilize available labor for development of community infrastructure. Its success in discouraging dependency was only moderate because many communities and local governments had little energy to organize food for work as well as manage food distribution. However, food was not denied to the needy because they had not participated in a food for work project. The success of the projects themselves was mixed, as some were not well designed for medium or long term community benefit. But the offer of food for participation on a project was popular. Africare found, for example, that certain communities were not able to mobilize labor for their water rehabilitation projects unless food was offered. In other communities, the existing Public Works program that paid Z\$4 per day was more attractive to some individuals than food for work.

To maximize the long-term impact of food for work, additional resources are needed for material inputs and skilled technical supervision. Unfortunately, the World Bank credit that was to finance such inputs was so slow in implementation that these did not arrive before the official end of the relief program. Nor was the procurement completed before the end of the crisis for 16 vehicles and 110 motor bikes intended for food for work monitors.

**The U.S. Role.** The United States had a significant role in this entire drought relief program, and the U.S. response was provided on a more timely basis than that of many other donors. From its side, the Zimbabwe government and SADC Food Security Unit have highlighted the following: contributions from the FEWS project of remote sensing data on vegetative cover to enhance the early warning database; early recognition of the problem and stimulus of interest on the part of other donors; the early purchase and delivery (the first among donors) of massive amounts of food; the provision of funds for operational interventions aimed at effecting prompt solutions to logistical and transport bottlenecks; stimulus to and support for the operations of the Logistics Advisory Center; and production of sorghum and millet seeds for planting.

An unfortunate factor in the U.S. assistance effort was the delay in USDA's reimbursement of internal transport, shipping and handling costs incurred by NGOs and the government to get the U.S.-provided food to internal distribution points. It was a full 12 months from the first expenses incurred to the first payments.

## **B. Direct Impact on Beneficiaries**

There were, reportedly, no deaths from starvation, though people suffered. A few deaths occurred from cholera during an outbreak related to the dearth of safe water in refugee camps and elsewhere. Beyond that, available data are insufficient to determine the extent of morbidity and mortality attributable to the combined effects of drought-induced malnutrition and disease.

Most people in rural areas remained at home, or went to urban areas only on a temporary basis to be closer to family members who could get food for them. Thus, they were still at home, or strong enough to return home, when the government offered seed packs for them to use in the planting season that began when rains actually fell again in late 1992.

The Child Supplemental Feeding Program was a great success. Although the nutritional situation of children had deteriorated between 1991 and 1992 in all provinces, the trend was completely reversed after the feeding program began. Available information indicates that a positive effect on the nutritional status of children under age five was achieved. The proportion of underweight children dropped from 25.5 percent before the program to 17 percent in half a year. The number who lost weight declined from 8.9 to 4.1 percent, and those gaining weight increased from 16.1 percent to 34.2 percent in the second calendar quarter of the program. A later survey showed, on the basis of upper arm measurements, that the percentages of severe and moderate malnutrition were not significantly higher than would be expected in a normal year.

The School Supplementary Feeding Program, late as it was in starting, and never adequately planned, funded or staffed, nevertheless showed a positive effect, as children receiving food not only attended more regularly, but were better able to give attention to their lessons. A persistent problem was presented by the limited availability of food in a community, leading to pressure to feed older children and other family members as well as the target group in grades one to three.

A degree of inequity in distribution to remote rural areas occurred because it was difficult in some places to organize transport from the Department of Social Welfare storage sites. It was not easy to persuade commercial transporters to go to the most remote areas, or to go there without charging an exorbitant fee. Thus, those communities for whom a private firm, private citizen or locally established NGO could offer transport may have been better served than certain other remote areas. The Department tried to respond to any problem of inequity or extreme deprivation that was brought to its attention by an NGO or other interested party. Ultimately, although people did suffer, they also did manage to gain sufficient nourishment for survival. And, as the report by Probe Market Research indicated, the drought had not been so prolonged as to deplete household resources and sources of income to the point where they could no longer purchase food.

Large numbers of urban individuals and families must have suffered a great deal, as they are likely to be chronically poor and unemployed, and to have been adversely affected by the drought-related economic turndown. These people, victims of the inflation and reduction in government programs that accompanied Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program, may have been beneficiaries of the program to address the structural dimensions of adjustment, which offers subsidies for social services, and may have continued to receive those specific benefits. Neither urban nor peri-urban groups were included in the drought relief or child and school feeding programs. Policy dictated that sufficient stocks were to be offered to millers to ensure that commercial purchases of food were accessible to any urban

resident who could afford them. Unfortunately, due to the rural orientation of the specific relief efforts—perhaps itself due to the concentration of political constituencies in rural areas—reports on the effects of the crisis on urban residents are not readily available.

### **C. Transition from Relief to Recovery Programs**

The government committed itself to agricultural recovery programs from the outset of the drought crisis. Attention to agricultural sector drought recovery was assigned to one of the inter-ministerial subcommittees of the National Drought Relief Task Force established in March 1992, with the instruction to provide services for smallholder farmers and to seek foreign exchange for vehicles, equipment and spare parts. The resulting Agricultural Sector Drought Recovery Program (ASDRP) of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development was intended to help restore minimum food self-sufficiency in the smallholder farm areas through: 1) provision of crop packs (seeds and fertilizer) to ensure that smallholder farmers would get back into production in the 1992/93 production season; 2) assistance in land preparation through tillage units; 3) a refundable cotton inputs scheme; 4) livestock preservation and restocking; and 5) revision of pricing policies. An additional objective was to attract financing for imported inputs and agricultural machinery for the larger scale commercial farming sector.

The target of the ASDRP was to ensure that most smallholder farmers had the opportunity to cultivate at least one or two hectares in 1992, one of which would normally be planted to maize, with the remainder devoted to sorghum, millet, sunflower, groundnut or cotton. Farmers were also encouraged to grow additional crops if they had access to more than the minimum area, in order to promote diversity and increase the overall national production. By repeating the input distribution program twice, AGRITEX was able to exceed by 25 percent its original target of 800,000 small scale farmers, though the individual and total areas planted were less than had been targeted. An insufficiency of small grain seeds caused farmers to plant maize in unsuitable areas, with unsatisfactory results, and problems of coordination of acquisition and delivery of inputs made the program less than optimally effective.

Most small scale farmers rely on their livestock for draught power. Their livestock either did not survive the drought or were too weakened to provide the needed power. The tillage scheme, implemented by the District Development Fund and Department of Rural Development, both of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, met only 35 percent of its target of 1.6 million hectares. Delays in budget approval, external procurement procedures and deliveries of imported tractors, combined with inadequate maintenance and servicing of government-owned tractors made it impossible to meet the target before the deadline of February 1993. The location of most of the farmers identified as potential beneficiaries were located in remote areas, and not adjacent to one another, made it difficult to schedule tractor dispersal efficiently.

The liberalization of agricultural prices, which began during the drought, continued into 1993, to the point where the fundamental objectives of pricing reform under the Economic Structural Adjustment Program had basically been achieved. The changes affecting maize prices were instrumental in promoting a high level of production in the 1992/93 season. Those reforms, and others that followed, show promise of a fundamental effect on long term development prospects. In the meantime, the distribution of packets of inputs (some of which originated in the USAID-funded special production project for sorghum and pearl millet seeds) to kick start production in the smallholder areas did contribute to a significant recovery in agricultural output, though the tillage program did not meet its acreage target because of a shortage of available tractors. Full recovery in livestock must await the period required for reproduction of herds and, for full success, will depend on changes in production systems to de-emphasize extensive grazing in favor of forage crop feeding.

The major agricultural marketing and financing organizations put on a series of radio programs to inform smallholder farmers on alternative tillage methods, sources of inputs and the availability of credit. The central bank extended a rollover credit facility to enable lenders to offer new crop loans to farmers unable to repay their debts from the previous year and to reschedule the old debts at more concessional rates. And the National Action Committee for water adopted a policy to construct two medium-sized dams per district per annum in smallholder areas.

As the recovery period moves into a period of resumption of development programs, and consideration of steps to alleviate the potential effects of future droughts, observers are recommending programs to promote: a) production of small grains in areas that are not ecologically suitable for maize; and b) organization by communities of reserve grain storage and rotation schemes. The Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program of ICRISAT, supported by USAID, is committed to cooperation with national organizations to extend tested varieties of small grains to the farming systems of growers in the nations of Southern Africa. To be accepted, the new varieties will have to be extended in conjunction with technologies for processing the grains. Organization of community storage schemes is likely to start with assistance from NGOs interested in building on community memories of past practices.

#### **D. Organization for Future Preparedness**

**Government of Zimbabwe Structures.** Although the recent drought, and others before it, have demonstrated that deficits in national food production will be a recurrent phenomenon, the Government of Zimbabwe has not established a comprehensive program to prepare for response in time of crisis.

In 1992, the President's March 6th declaration of the drought as a national disaster was made in accordance with the terms of the Civil Protection Act, No.5 of 1989. That Act, implementation of which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, provides for establishment of a National Civil Protection Coordinating

Committee (NCPCC). Such a Committee existed, but for the response to the 1992 disaster the President elevated responsibility to a National Drought Relief Task Force under the chairmanship of one of the country's two Vice Presidents. That Task Force was charged with initiating a Drought Relief Program, to be carried out by inter-ministerial subcommittees of the Task Force, and seeking external assistance to help finance its implementation. Responsible ministries and agencies were empowered to bypass normal bureaucratic hurdles as necessary to ensure the survival of drought-affected people.

The Department of Civil Protection in the Ministry of Local Government was not activated during the period of response to the drought, and was disbanded later in accordance with the program to reduce the size of the civil service. The food relief program was implemented by a special committee staffed by employees of the Department of Social Welfare of the Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Social Welfare, under the general guidance of the Task Force Subcommittee on Drought Relief. The continuing existence of the NCPCC under its parent ministry is unclear.

In the meantime, the Department of Social Welfare, through its parent ministry, has proposed formation of a permanent ministerial department to be concerned with drought preparedness. It has also suggested modifications to the Welfare Organizations Act, which calls for certain procedures to register recipients of food relief. Discussion and approval of the Department's proposals is still pending. No other proposals for formal organization for preparedness have been tabled.

**Workshops to Stimulate Attention to Preparedness.** Several multilateral institutions have already organized workshops to follow up on the drought, engage participants in reporting and planning exercises relevant to their country situation, and offer guidelines or training modules for future action. The SADC Food Security Unit's workshop of September 1993, which is to be followed by a series of national workshops, offered an opportunity for senior policy makers to assess and compare their experience before it was forgotten. Country papers described the institutional structures involved; some papers assessed their effectiveness and suggested structures for the future. The workshop summarized needs for training in drought management at regional and national levels and identified areas for possible future policy related research.

WHO organized a meeting in October 1993 for representatives of Ministries of Health to discuss their experience in management of health emergencies, increase awareness of the significance of health aspects of disasters, promote a more effective role of health personnel in cooperation with those of other sectors, and develop specific strategies for country training in the region in the area of emergency preparedness and response. In addition to their interest in the technical components of preparedness from the health point of view, participants were particularly concerned about organization of inter-sectoral management and the socio-political aspects of disaster management.

## **E. Longer Term Planning**

**Regional Planning.** Zimbabwe is intrinsically involved in two key arenas of regional follow up to the 1991/92 drought emergency: transport management and food security policy and assessment.

The experience gained, together with the links forged, during the coordinated transport effort of the drought period promises to continue to play a constructive role in the region. At a meeting of the Southern Corridor Strategic committee in March 1993, the contiguous railways of the region, donor agencies and grain importers supported at proposal from Spoornet to broaden the scope of the Operations Control Center in Johannesburg in order to coordinate the movement of all goods by rail between South Africa and other countries of the region. National Railways of Zimbabwe has also expanded its operations control function in a new Operations Management Center in Bulawayo. The new Center will have communication links to Spoornet's Operations Management Center—Africa, and to satellite sub-stations at various strategic junctions within Zimbabwe, as well as to the railways of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. The immediate impetus to these moves was the need to handle an unshipped balance of 600,000 MT of food aid, but longer term motivation is to create an efficient regional rail system.

The Spoornet Operations Control Center is continuing to manage all goods traffic destined to move from South Africa to other parts of the region, to manage a traffic reservation system for cross-border operations, to ensure advance notification to contiguous railways of train movements, to operate a train control mechanism that records the movement of trains diagrammatically; to facilitate rail-to-road transfers, to manage a centralized wagon control system; and to market and advertise Spoornet as part of a southern Africa network. The Center's network includes ports authorities, public and private sector clients, cargo handlers and shipping agents. For the future the Center envisions implementation of a contingency planning system for response to natural disasters and accidents and provision of a seamless regional service, breaking down barriers that compromise services to customers while enabling the constituent railways to retain their identity and individuality.

The Bulawayo Operations Management Center is intended to develop a capacity for traffic planning and operations monitoring and control; establish linkages with contiguous railways to provide a completely integrated and efficient rail service for international and local traffic; provide one-stop information on traffic movement; and ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency in operating performance through coordinated monitoring of all activities. Presumably donor financing will be necessary for such a capacity-building effort, but in the meantime, representatives of the contiguous railways have been appointed to full time positions in a temporary traffic control room that has been operating since March 1993.

The SADC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit, located in Zimbabwe, is reconsidering the alternatives for adopting and financing some kind of regional food security program, either a physical storage system or a financial mechanism to help countries suffering



from temporary deficits. On the broader policy level, it will begin to develop thinking about the possibilities for common agricultural policies on, for example, seed release regulations or reductions in inter-regional marketing barriers.

Through a pilot effort in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique, financed by the Netherlands, the Unit will test the feasibility and costs of analyzing household food security and nutrition status for purposes of early warning of vulnerability to food deficits.

With financing from the African Development Bank, the Logistic Advisory Center, now reverted to the Food Security Unit, will continue to help coordinate shipments of relief donations that have not yet been delivered and help plan systems that can be put in place quickly in a future emergency. In the absence of crisis, the Center can devote more time to creation of a market information system for regional producers and could, possibly, develop a periodic bulletin to cover early warning data not only on production, but also on pricing and markets, and including results of nutritional surveillance (should the pilot project show this to be feasible).

**National Planning.** On the national level in Zimbabwe, longer term planning is concentrated currently on implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, which is in the third of a five-year implementation period. The degree of attention that will be given in that context to food security policy, either at the level of national food stocks, or to the household level food security that is achieved by subsistence production combined with ability to earn income, is not clear.

Considering the clear evidence that recurrence of drought is endemic to the Southern Africa region, and the historic experience demonstrating that it is extremely difficult to manage national food security through price controls and maintenance of a national food stock, it is timely for Zimbabwe to give more attention to inclusion in budgets and development plans of specific strategies to mitigate the potential effects of future droughts.

To date, the body most specifically concerned with strategy for future mitigation is the National Action Committee for water, which has established objectives for large dams (one per province), as well as for medium and small water projects.

Other steps now recommended by observers but not yet implemented include:

- promotion and organization of household and community-based investment in preservation methods and storage facilities, for inputs and for production surpluses;
- feedlots and forage crops for a livestock herd sufficient for draught power for small scale farms;

- promotion of sorghum and millet in areas where ecological conditions are not good enough for reliable production of maize, together with appropriate technologies to process the grains; and
- expansion of the public works programs of the District Development Fund, for example to include irrigation schemes in water projects, and building of local district capacities to supervise projects, in years of good rainfall as well as of drought.

## **V. Special Issues**

### **A. Differing but Complementary Uses of Funds Appropriated for Disaster and for Development**

One of the notable elements of the USAID response to the drought was the speed with which the mission was able to commit funds to support the operations of the Logistics Advisory Center in Harare, finance enhancements to the transport system and other purposes. The situation was unique, in that funds were available to be committed to the Southern Africa Regional Program from the FY 1992 appropriation for the Development Fund for Africa. The Mission Director proposed, and the Africa Bureau agreed, that the Regional Program could be used in conjunction with disaster relief funds to achieve the two purposes of furthering development and helping to manage response to the disaster.

The Southern Africa Drought Emergency Logistics project was designed to enhance the coordinated efficiency of the regional transport system. Thus, coordination and communication systems were instituted, transport officials from landlocked countries worked hand in hand with South African officials to develop a traffic management system that is continuing after the drought, the railways increased their efficiency in response to an incentive offered for faster than normal turnaround times, and Zimbabwean officials learned how to empty South African wagons in record time and reduce their leasing costs by returning them promptly across the border. Funds from a project to support UNCTAD's regional traffic improvement program were used to identify and break bottlenecks at border crossings. And funds were added by USAID and CIDA to the regional Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program carried out by ICRISAT to move more quickly to produce seeds for use in the region. The development benefit of that work has already become apparent in ICRISAT's stronger commitment to move the results of its research more quickly into the national production systems of the region.<sup>42</sup>

One of the NGOs active in water supply work received two grants for its work in Zimbabwe. The first, a regional grant from OFDA to cover work in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia, was intended for rehabilitation of existing water points on an emergency basis, without fundamental structural improvements. The second, from the Development Fund for Africa, was intended to enable post-drought recovery by developing new water supply points in the context of the work of the District Development Funds in seriously affected districts. An

evaluation of the OFDA grant has pointed out that it was not easy for the NGO to maintain the distinction between the two grants in its actual field operations and its accounting.

## **B. Relation of Drought Response to Structural Adjustment**

It is not easy to assure, as recommended by OFDA following its assessment of the drought in Southern Africa, that the effects of structural adjustment be separated from those of drought so as to encourage governments to continue their planned economic reforms. Drought will always, as it did in Zimbabwe, put sufficient stress on government budgets and foreign exchange reserves to threaten the country's ability to implement structural reforms. Direct costs will be incurred for imports of food and other needed items, and indirect costs in losses of revenue as the drought forces an economic downturn. It will be difficult to avoid increased budget deficits, as welfare programs will have to be financed, and difficult to retrench public employment in the face of reduced opportunities for alternative income generation.

International donors and governments tend not to recognize exceptional circumstances that could affect the timetable of economic reform. After the fact, the Ministry of Finance estimated the cost of the drought response in 1992 to have been the equivalent of some US\$ 300 to 350 million, or 16.7% of national expenditure. Before the fact, however, neither the government nor the World Bank had been prepared to discuss the potential effects of the drought on the economic reform program at the Consultative Group meeting of February 1992. It was not until July that World Bank committed a substantial credit for drought recovery.

Two contrasting particular phenomena were manifested in the relationship between drought and structural adjustment in Zimbabwe. The first was stress on the welfare programs under the World Bank-financed program to address the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA). The second was accomplishment of politically risky steps to further liberalize the commercial marketing of grain.

Those vulnerable individuals who had fallen through the structural adjustment safety net were more than ever at risk under the circumstances of shortages, price increases and inflation caused by a severe drought. Furthermore, the drought in Zimbabwe had increased, as it will anywhere, the vulnerability of additional persons who lost their jobs, and numbers of low income persons whose living costs had increased as a result of structural adjustment measures already taken. The SDA program, which was designed to deal with such problems, was overwhelmed by the increase in the number of applicants for assistance, at the same time that those government agencies charged with delivering the special assistance were overextended in their efforts to respond to effects of the drought that would have existed even without the structural adjustment. Moreover, because disbursement for the SDA program had been delayed, it was inadequately funded to meet the demand.

On a totally different track, the top government servants involved in both structural adjustment and the drought response proposed to Cabinet some steps toward liberalization of the grain market that risked strong opposition by important producers and processors of the private sector and could have provoked a backlash of violent public dissent. Cabinet agreed, first, to removal of the subsidy in the price of grain offered by the government's Grain Marketing Board to selected large milling companies. A later decision crushed the monopoly held by the companies by permitting sales by the Board, and by private producers, to any miller or other entrepreneur. Even more boldly, in the face of a wide disparity between the import price of maize and its controlled retail price within the country, Cabinet agreed to decontrol retail prices. The move was acceptable, or was hardly noticed, because the nominal price of maize had increased already as a result of exchange rate adjustments and drought-induced inflation.

### **C. Food Security and the Optimum Magnitude of a National Food Reserve**

Alarmed by the experience of a precariously low level of grain reserves in early 1992, when the Grain Marketing Board held no more than two weeks' worth of normal sales to millers, the President announced that there shall be maintained in future a national reserve of 936,000 MT of maize. Such an amount represents the maximum historic annual official sales turnover—assuming that grain marketing is not further privatized under the economic structural adjustment program—and is far larger than most government and private observers consider to be necessary or affordable.

The country needs to design a policy that defines the separate roles of government and the market in food security. On the part of government, presumably the size of a safety reserve could be defined on the basis of monthly consumption during the leanest months in terms of harvested stocks and the time that is required for negotiation, shipment and arrival of commercial imports to fill the gap. The role of the market place in the sale and purchase of both local and imported grains is to be broadened under continuing economic reform. Such reform is likely to encourage private community and individual investment in locally stored food reserve stocks. A truly national security that encompasses adequate nutrition at the household level will not be possible, however, until economic growth and development have raised household incomes to the point where they can afford to purchase needed foods.

## **VI. Conclusions**

### **A. Attention to Early Warning**

Timely and well documented warnings are not always heeded by government officials and donors. A conscious effort is necessary, therefore, to capture the attention of decision makers and stimulate them to action.

The lack of attention to early warnings (from the Grain Marketing Board as early as August 1991, from the National and Regional Early Warning Units in November, and from USAID in international fora in early February) led to (a) late action to mobilize financial and food resources by donors, (b) delay of donor deliveries of food until October 1992 at the earliest, (c) government dismay when South Africa could not deliver the 100,000 metric tons of a negotiated sale, and (d) the necessity for government to use scarce foreign exchange reserves for commercial imports of fully half of the country's grain requirements.

The period between donor pledges and actual delivery of food commodities is so long (the quickest to Zimbabwe from the United States, which was the first and fastest donor, was five months) that even if a country reacts promptly to mobilize donor interest reports, it also will have to use its own resources to purchase its earliest requirements.

### **B. Priority Attention to Logistical Arrangements**

The regional assessments by World Food Program and OFDA both recognized the enormous logistical challenge that would have to be met to achieve delivery of needed foods through the Indian Ocean ports to the coastal and inland countries suffering from the drought.

The early conclusion of USAID/Zimbabwe, somewhat controversial at the time, that its first priority for attention must be assistance in transport logistics was fully vindicated by the unprecedented and extraordinary performance of both public and private sectors of the Southern Africa region in managing the importation and delivery to ten countries of almost 12 million tons of food within a period of a little over a year.

### **C. Modification of Usual Procurement Procedures**

Traditional procurement procedures are frequently too cumbersome for effective and rapid response to disasters. Managers of logistical systems to move food imports to their Southern African destinations were frustrated, and operations were slowed, by the cumbersome tendering procedures enforced for many months by World Food Program headquarters. Funds provided by the USAID Southern Africa Regional Program moved promptly when used for local expenses, such as the lease locomotives and wagons from South Africa, but such was not the case for funds used to procure machinery from overseas. The procedures followed under the drought relief credit from World Bank were so slow that many commodities (such as drilling rigs and vehicles) were not available until after the severe drought period. Maize

provided under that credit arrived so late (after the 1993 harvest of late 1992 plantings) that the Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Board put some of it on the market at the port without bringing it into Zimbabwe.

#### **D. Presence of Experienced Personnel**

Experienced personnel make a critical difference in the quality and effectiveness of response to a disaster.

The outstanding record of USAID/Zimbabwe—in mobilizing attention to the pending and instant disaster for Zimbabwe and the region as a whole, in enhancing the databases and analytical capabilities of early warning analysis and drought relief administrators, in coordinating and monitoring the delivery of U.S. food to rural beneficiaries in Zimbabwe itself, in mobilizing regional logistical coordination and promoting specific actions to break transport bottlenecks, and in stimulating the regional agricultural research program to produce sorghum and millet seeds for planting during the late rains of 1992—can be attributed to the presence of a USAID Director with profound experience in management of response to disasters caused by drought. Furthermore, the Director recruited for part time assistance to the mission a USAID officer experienced in food aid who returned from leave to offer his expertise, a retired USAID officer experienced in drought relief and in the agriculture sector of Zimbabwe, and an engineer experienced in transport logistics. On behalf of USAID, an American who had experience in managing the rural projects financed by the Ambassador's self help fund visited the NGO water activities to monitor and report their progress.

#### **E. Level of Authority of Designated Drought Coordinating Bodies**

Although cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial action is necessary in case of disaster, designation of a coordinating body at the highest level of government will not necessarily ensure coordinated action. Appointment of such a high level body may empower effective inter-ministerial action but does not guarantee it. In Zimbabwe, the high level Drought Relief Task Force established under the chairmanship of a Vice President did not meet frequently, and did not operate as an action body. However, there was sufficient confidence in the interest of the country's President, and his determination to meet the challenges of the disaster, to encourage inter-ministerial cooperation at levels below that of the Task Force itself.

The transport subcommittee of the Task Force was remarkably effective as a forum that included government and private sector representatives, held weekly meetings that were open to any affected organizations and followed up on decisions taken. The combined levels of experience and participation were sufficiently high to ensure mutual respect and willingness not only to raise issues but also to organize action to resolve them. Outside the Task Force altogether, a small group of highly placed civil servants, in such ministries as those of finance, trade and industry and agriculture, were willing to raise issues to Cabinet level and able to stimulate pivotal economic and political decisions.

## **F. Recognition and Use of Local Circumstances and Capabilities**

A country such as Zimbabwe, which has a well developed private sector, a relatively well functioning government, and an established official drought relief food program, and a country in which the experience of UN agencies and NGOs in relief programs is limited to refugee camps, can be relied upon to manage effectively the principal aspects of its own disaster relief response.

The government did an excellent job, though its actions were reinforced and amplified by those of the private sector, of which both commercial and non-profit elements were fully committed to helping assuage the effects of the drought. The government-designated transport subcommittee would have been far less effective without the participation of private shippers, agents and transporters. In spite of their more developmental orientation, and their initial conclusion that they could best contribute by developing badly needed water supply, the NGOs did handle the distribution of about 13 percent of the food relief between decentralized storage points and more remote rural areas. But the NGOs were weak in their ability to coordinate with each other or with government and in their capacity to handle food relief, and were severely stretched to accomplish as much as they did.

## **G. Relative Operational Effectiveness of Decentralized Structures**

In Zimbabwe, competence in food commodity management, registration procedures and other aspects of the food relief program varies from one province and district to another depending on the capabilities of ministry staff and degree of positive commitment by political leaders. Implementation of the food relief program demonstrated that, on the whole, decentralized management can improve selectively on the central government systems. For example, one province of Zimbabwe, recognized for its efficient and effective administration of the program, became known for its publicized clamp-down on thefts of food, its reliance on local agricultural and health agents and community leaders to clean up the bloated registration lists, and its citizens' pressure on the politicians to adhere to guidelines and procedures.

The NGOs of Zimbabwe concluded, at their review workshop, that coordination among themselves, and between them and the central government, had not been very effective, but the record was better at provincial and district levels. It was at the local level, moreover, that NGOs were able to mobilize transport for food relief and personnel and borrow equipment from commercial farmers for water supply operations. And it was at that level that they, in cooperation with community leaders, were able to identify the truly needy households among those registered for relief.

## **H. Existence of Household Coping Mechanisms**

Without a full understanding of household demography and income strategies, it is difficult to assess accurately the need for relief food. Food relief agencies tend sometimes to overestimate requirements, perhaps because of their experience in providing food to refugee camps where no other sources of supply are available, or in longer term more structurally-determined food shortage situations. The ultimate limitation of food rations to an average of 5 kg. per person per month in Zimbabwe, though politically criticized when it was announced, proved to be adequate in communities surveyed and monitored under the program. Because the drought was basically no more than a year in duration, household resources and other coping mechanisms were not exhausted.

### **I. Duplication of Effort by Donor Headquarters Agencies, Donor Field Staff and Country Agencies**

All donor agencies, and most responsible governments, have their own mechanisms for assessing need, monitoring operations and preventing fraud. None have yet become sufficiently aware of the need to modify their procedures in the interest of speed and efficiency in the context of disaster. A number of instances occurred in Zimbabwe. Each instance in itself perhaps was not very significant, but the cumulative effect appears to have been to generate unnecessary expense and to draw attention and energy away from current operations.

Examples affecting officials and private sector operators in Zimbabwe include (a) duplication of the analysis of the National Early Warning Unit, an FAO-assisted operation, by a needs assessment team from FAO headquarters, followed by a further needs assessment by OFDA; (b) an abortive effort by a firm on contract to the Washington Office of Food for Peace to verify the monitoring procedures already put into effect by the Zimbabwe government and private sector and by USAID; and (c) the introduction of equipment and training to busy operating offices in an effort, designed by the Africa Bureau in Washington, to introduce a system of local telephone communication using computer software.

### **J. Difficulties in Establishing Registers of Needy Persons**

Registers of persons and households needing food relief are subject to inflation in spite of careful design, unless the implementing agency has supplemental information, as from longitudinal household survey data, to verify relative vulnerability of communities and community members. The system established by the Department of Social Welfare for screening and registering persons needing food relief, which was based on a questionnaire covering current household data, was quietly but effectively undermined by unrecognized duplications of household registrants and deliberate skewing of lists by local politicians. The final list of registrants comprised 5.6 million persons, or 54 percent of the entire population of the country. The list was not pared down until after the President instructed politicians to lay off, and a limitation on the budget for food relief forced a reduction in household ration to



the point where communities themselves began to agree as to who were their most needy members.

#### **K. Difficulties in Establishing Food for Work Programs**

Food for work programs do not always fulfill the purposes for which they were established, either to ensure that persons do not receive food for nothing or to accomplish community development projects. Although Zimbabwe established the principle that food relief was not to be given gratis except to young and aged dependents and disabled persons, it was not possible to mount effective food for work programs in all jurisdictions. Firstly, district authorities did not have the capability, or the time during the disaster, to design projects that were physically and economically appropriate for their jurisdictions. Secondly, some citizens were attracted to projects in the public works program, for which they were paid in cash, rather than to food for work. Thirdly, the women of the community, who had to spend more than the usual time on their usual responsibilities as well as help prepare supplemental feeding programs and physically unload and distribute relief food bags, simply were not available for food for work projects.

## **VII. Recommendations**

### **A. To Promote Rapid Response**

#### **1. Attention to Early Warnings**

Special attention is required to promote "early listening" to early warnings of disaster, both within disaster threatened countries and among bilateral and multilateral donors. A USAID mission can promote press coverage and mobilize donors to energize the government and their own response mechanisms. It is the countries themselves, however, that must establish effective systems to communicate warnings to decision-making levels of government and to mobilize appropriate action.

#### **2. Assignment of Experienced and Capable Personnel**

a. Where personnel with drought experience are not available in USAID field offices dealing with disasters, A.I.D. should transfer or recruit such personnel for placement in the field as rapidly as possible.

b. A.I.D. should also:

- maintain an up-to-date roster of disaster-experienced personnel, covering such factors as their location and availability, experience in disasters and development, areas of geographic and technical expertise, and language capability;
- consider entering into Indefinite Quantity Contracts to gain ready access to appropriately experienced personnel as needed;
- support training programs in disaster response and preparedness, exploring the sharing resources and responsibilities with organizations such as the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or other organization that have developed training programs offering particular types of training or geographic expertise; and
- ensure that such programs are offered to country and donor staff on a continuing basis in order to create sufficiently broad institution capabilities.

### **3. Coordination of Needs Assessments**

To the extent that it is necessary for each donor agency to conduct its own assessment, for reasons of internal credibility, each assessment should, at the least, be coordinated with those of other agencies, in timing and coverage, and ideally in definitions, assumptions and methodology as well.

#### **B. To Promote Efficiency and Effectiveness**

##### **1. Adequate Staffing and Operational Resources**

To organize an effective response to disaster, A.I.D. should take prompt action to assure that adequate numbers of experienced and capable persons are re-assigned or recruited for responsible offices or task forces in Washington and in the field. Those staff should be supported with adequate space, equipment and support staff to carry out their responsibilities.

##### **2. Logistical Planning and Coordination**

For every emergency where substantial movement of commodities will be required, A.I.D. should promote formation of national or regional logistics coordination and operation functions. Any in-country or regional task force will be most effective if it includes both public and private operators as well as government officials with decision making powers.

##### **3. Decentralization of Responsibility**

Although USAIDs are likely to deal with central governments on such matters as import agreements and donations of food commodities, they should always explore available means to take advantage of the more effective coordination and management mechanisms that are often possible at provincial and district levels.

##### **4. Prompt Reimbursement to Local Bodies by U.S. Agencies**

A.I.D. and USDA should design a voucher processing system that will reimburse governments and NGOs promptly for costs incurred, as for internal transport and handling of food commodities.

## **C. To Promote Preparedness through Development-related Activity**

### **1. Improved Methods of Targeting Needy Communities and Households**

Through either its disaster preparedness or its development programs, A.I.D. should promote improved analysis of household demography, nutrition status and incomes as a basis for understanding mechanisms to cope with disaster and for targeting food relief. It should also review and consider the various alternative methods of determining the size of required ration and identifying persons needing food aid that are currently advocated by members of the development community.

Among alternatives for size of ration are:

- adherence to World Health Organization or World Food Program guidelines for a nutritious daily ration;
- reduction of the ration in accordance with understanding of total household resources and coping mechanisms; or, of necessity
- establishment of as large a ration as can be afforded, or is available, considering the geographic extent of need, and encouraging community leaders, extension agents and local NGO representatives to identify the most needy among the individuals or households of each community.

Among alternatives for targeting are:

- blanket aid to any community in which the number of affected persons or households exceeds a certain percentage;
- delivery of food aid to all members of a sub-group (infants, school age children, pregnant or aged persons) whether or not all are equally needy;
- delivery of food aid to one senior female on behalf of a household or sub-household;
- strict adherence to identification of specific needy persons within a household and a community; or
- use of a voucher system for purchase of foods by certain categories of needy persons (as, for example, urban residents).

## **2. Linkages between Response to Disaster and Structural Adjustment**

During the period of response to a disaster, managers of USAID development programs should bear in mind the potential for A.I.D. and other donors to:

- benefit from the data prepared to assess needs and target the response to plan adjustments to programs to address the social dimensions of adjustment; and
- urge government to use the occasion of the disaster take steps toward adjustments that will improve the future outlook for national and household food security.

## **3. Distinction between Preparedness and Development Activities**

A.I.D. should maintain the distinction between the roles of OFDA in preparedness and of USAID missions in the development activities that will make the inhabitants of a country less vulnerable to future disasters.

Among activities suitable to the former role would be establishment of internal institutional structures of public and private sector representatives, identification of resources potentially available for response to disaster, training of human resources and building of analytical and technical capacities of governmental and non-governmental institutions, prepositioning of commodities or equipment, and promotion of legal and technical safeguards.

A number of steps toward development that will be promoted through USAID program strategies will lead toward reduced vulnerability to drought. Among these could be food security policy and measures, on-farm and off-farm capacities for pest-free food storage, crop and livestock production strategies, seed multiplication, reliable water supply, opportunities for education and incomes for women and other members of poor rural and urban households, and nutrition education.

Development projects can, and should, take into consideration the need to establish the foundation in growth and incomes that will enable resistance to, and recovery from, natural disaster. Similarly, recovery programs that are integral to a disaster response, may enhance the potential for future development in affected areas, as when small grains that are more drought tolerant than maize are distributed to farmers who should not have been growing maize in the first instance. Development activities as such, however, should be kept separate from the realm of disaster relief, recovery and preparedness.

## **VIII. Lessons Learned**

- Timely and well documented warnings are not always heeded by government officials and donors. A conscious effort is necessary, therefore, to capture the attention of decision makers and stimulate them to action.
- The period between donor pledges and actual delivery of food commodities is so long (the quickest to Zimbabwe from the United States, which was the first and fastest donor, was five months) that even if a country reacts promptly to mobilize donor interest reports, it also will have to use its own resources to purchase its earliest requirements.
- Traditional procurement procedures are frequently too cumbersome for effective and rapid response to disasters.
- Experienced personnel make a critical difference in the quality and effectiveness of response to a disaster.
- Although cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial action is necessary in case of disaster, designation of a coordinating body at the highest level of government will not necessarily ensure coordinated action. Appointment of such a high level body may empower effective inter-ministerial action but does not guarantee it.
- Implementation of the food relief program demonstrated that, on the whole, decentralized management can improve selectively on the central government systems.
- Without a full understanding of household demography and income strategies, it is difficult to assess accurately the need for relief food. Food relief agencies tend to overestimate requirements, perhaps because of their experience in providing food to refugee camps where no other sources of supply are available, or in longer term more structurally-determined food shortage situations.
- All donor agencies, and most responsible governments, have their own mechanisms for assessing need, monitoring operations and preventing fraud. None have yet become sufficiently aware of the need to modify their procedures in the interest of speed and efficiency in the context of disaster.
- Registers of persons and households needing food relief are subject to inflation in spite of careful design, unless the implementing agency has supplemental information, as from longitudinal household survey data, to verify relative vulnerability of communities and community members.

- Food for work programs do not always fulfill the purposes for which they were established, either to ensure that persons do not receive food for nothing or to accomplish community development projects. A significant factor which mitigates against the success of food for work programs as a disaster relief strategy is that regional/local authorities may not have the capability, or the time during a disaster, to properly design and manage projects that are physically, socially and economically appropriate.

**Annex A: Chronology  
Southern Africa Drought Relief and Recovery**

Zimbabwe, 1991-1993

**I. METEOROLOGICAL FACTORS**

1901-1992	Records of almost a century of fluctuation in rainfall, ranging from over 500 mm above (1923/24) to 335 mm below (1991/92) the ten year running mean (see figure in Appendix B).
1980-1981 1982-1983 1982-1983 1982-1983	Four droughts in the first decade of independence, with adverse effect on the national growth rate of the economy, due to the significance of the contribution of agriculture to the economy.
1991-1992	Latest drought more difficult to manage, as it affected all countries within the region.
Apr 1992	Estimate of national maize production at less than 20 percent of average for 1988-1990.
Oct-Dec 1992	Rainfall close to normal level
Feb-Mar 1993	Normal rainfall

**II. RESPONSE AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES**

**By the Government of Zimbabwe**

Nov 1990	Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) approved, and credits from World Bank and IMF negotiated.
Dec 1990	Last agreement for commercial export of Zimbabwe grain.
Apr 1991	Grain Marketing Board (GMB) budget request for foreign exchange to import grains that would be needed by March 1992, considering continuing dry weather and the low intake of the current crop.
Jul 1991	Signals from the National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) and Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) that current crop production was very low, with



- warning that current stocks might not be sufficient to carry through to the early 1992 harvest.
- Aug 1991 Grain Marketing Board (GMB) application for foreign exchange to import from South Africa to bridge the anticipated gap to March 1992.
- GMB decision that it could not participate in triangular grain swap under discussion (to involve U.S. wheat to Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe maize to Zambia).
- Oct 1991 GMB trip to South Africa to explore possibility of commercial imports of white maize.
- Nov 1991 NEWU alert of pending drought.
- REWU alert to all member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that the drought was widespread and that countries of the region would not be able to provide grain for each other. (The same severe drought had occurred in South Africa.
- Stocks of grain in Zimbabwe dangerously low; risk that they would be inadequate for the annual January-February period of consumption preceding first harvest period; prediction of failure of the harvest due to lack of late year rains.
- Government review of the situation and assessment of the risk that stocks might be depleted; decision to honor 1990 commitments to sell maize to Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique.
- 20 Dec 1991 Letter of Commitment for purchase of maize from South Africa approved.
- 31 Dec 1991 Arrival of first shipments of purchase from South Africa.
- Feb 1992 In the face of certain failure of rains, government appeal to donors for emergency maize shipments.
- 6 Mar 1992 Presidential declaration of a National Disaster and establishment of drought relief Task Force to coordinate and monitor the drought relief and recovery program and mobilize resources.
- Mar 1992 Arrival and prompt distribution of commercial orders of late 1991; cessation of food riots in urban areas.

Declaration of force majeure and cancellation of agreements for grain exports to other countries of the region (with one exception of 2,000 MT for Botswana).

Apr 92 Responsibilities of National Civil Protection Coordination Committee (NCPCC), established in accordance with the Civil Protection Act No. 5 of 1989 and National Disaster Plan, and administered by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, subsumed by the Task Force.

Establishment of hierarchical structure of committees at ministerial, provincial and district; each including representatives of government, NGOs and the commercial private sector.

Re-allocation of funds for more intensive operations by the National Action Committee charged with implementation of the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program.

Jul 1992 Establishment of Child Supplementary Feeding Program for villages where over 15 percent of children under age five were found to be malnourished.

Aug 1992 Grain Marketing Board offer of incentive price to maize producers for 1992/93 season (up from Z\$580 to Z\$900) and removal of subsidy in price to the four approved grain millers.

First meeting of NGOs with Department of Social Welfare.

Oct 1992 First arrival at port of U.S. maize under PL480 Title I, and delivery to Zimbabwe.

Nov 1992 Arrival at port of U.S. sorghum under Section 416.

Dec 1992 Initiation of school supplemental feeding program for children in grades 1 to 3 in designated schools in areas not already receiving assistance from NGOs.

Jan 1993 Arrival of U.S. sorghum in Zimbabwe.

Mar 1993 Decontrol of consumer prices of bread and grains.

30 Apr 1993 Termination of the drought as a "National Disaster". Disbandment of Drought Relief Task Force. Reversion of Role of coordinating disasters to Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.

1 Jun 1993 Elimination of subsidy to millers designated to purchase GMB grains.

28 Jul 1993 Decontrol of maize sales to millers and prices to consumers and confirmation of removal of controls on other commodities.

By Multilateral Agencies

- Mar 1991 Report in regular quarterly Early Warning Bulletin of SADCC's Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) in the Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) that stock levels in the region were too low for comfort, and requirements could rise as high as 3,000,000 MT.
- Mar 1991 Review of ESAP at World Bank-led Consultative Group meeting; food import requirements not a factor.
- Aug 1991 Report to the annual summit meeting of SADCC by FSTAU that the last harvest had been relatively thin, and some 2,500,000 MT of food would have to be imported before April 1992.
- Dec 1991 Interagency Steering Committee of United Nations (UN) agencies formed in the context of draft United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution (which passed April 14) mandating coordination of UN Agencies engaged in relief operations.
- Indication to REWU from data on cloud cover and remote sensing data on vegetation that the entire region is dry; countries would not be able to import from their neighbors as in past dry periods.
- Jan 1992 Recognition by regional heads of state of SADCC that the previous rainy season had been satisfactory, but food stocks would be in deficit until April; instruction to FSTAU to analyze the shortfall, draw up a plan and convene a donors' conference.
- Feb 1992 Pledges of support for Zimbabwe's ESAP at Consultative Group meeting; no formal consideration of the potential influence of drought-related factors.
- Mar 1992 Beginning of operations by UN staff of what was to become the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), with Jan Eliasson in charge.
- Jul 1992 Drought recovery credit of \$100 million from World Bank on soft terms.
- Mar-Apr 92 Confirmation by FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions to 10 countries of Southern Africa that drought had severely affected crops throughout the region (except in Angola, where food shortages were due

mainly to insecurity), with conclusion that a major relief effort was needed to avert massive famine.

Assessments of logistical needs by WFP in cooperation with SADC REWU and national SADC member systems, and decision to establish a Logistics Advisory Center in Harare to coordinate information on ship movements, ports, etc.

- 14 Apr 92      Passage of UNGA Res 46/182: Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations.
- 15 Apr 92      Decisions by meeting of SADCC ministers of transport and of agriculture to: 1) establish a regional drought relief task force of representatives from transport and agriculture ministries and national drought relief organizations, to be chaired by Zimbabwe; 2) establish six transport corridor groups, each based on the port offering access to the interior, and chaired by the respective port authority, the whole to be chaired by the Southern Africa Transport Coordination Committee (SATCC); 3) establish a Logistics Advisory Center in Harare to coordinate information on transport logistics; and 4) call for a donor conference to seek assistance.
- 15 Apr 92      Issuance of joint FAO/WFP alert as to seriousness of the deficit in the Southern African region.
- April 1992      Appointment by UN Secretary General of Jan Eliasson as Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and formation of DHA.
- Consolidated appeal document drafted at working group meeting in Geneva under auspices of DHA with participation by UN Agencies, World Bank, IMF, NGOs.
- May 1992      SADCC Task Force consultations with DHA leading to joint leadership of donor pledging conference.
- Estimates of country requirements for non-food aid presented to DHA by UN Resident Representatives.
- 1-2 Jun 92      Pledging conference, Geneva, reviewed requirements for Targeted Food Aid (to be distributed free), Program Food Aid (for commercial imports) and Non-Food Aid; over 80 percent for food and related logistics in the form of 1.645 million tons of basic food commodities for free distribution; an additional 2.5 million tons of food to be required as program food aid.

Estimates for Zimbabwe at US\$209 million, all but US\$21 million for food.

- 15 Jun 1992 WFP Area Director in Harare designated as United Nations Regional Coordinator for Logistics and Food Transport, responsible for coordinating all food aid movements and related logistics in the region and for WFP management role in the Regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC).
- Jun 1992 Grant of US\$ 950,000 to UNICEF/Zimbabwe, of which 391,400 for small water projects to contain or reduce the need for distress migration in search of water.
- Jul 1992 Per WFP estimate, 77% of "target" food aid to the region pledged, and 35% of "program" food aid.
- Relaxation by IMF and World Bank of targets for trade liberalization and deficit reduction in Zimbabwe under structural adjustment program, in recognition of costs of drought in foreign exchange costs, demands on public expenditure, stress on parastatal budgets and rise in unemployment.
- Sep 1992 World Bank credit of US\$ 35 million for purchase of maize.
- Dec 1992 Pledges at donor conference hosted by World Bank in Paris confirm the donor conclusion that Zimbabwe had done an admirable job of reconciling the demands of both ESAP and the drought relief and recovery program.
- Jun 1993 Final report by UNDHA and SADC and official end of Southern Africa Drought Emergency appeal.

By the United States Government and U.S. Non-Governmental Agencies

- Nov-Dec 91 Discussions among U.S. Embassy, USDA and Government of Zimbabwe of possible concessional sales of U.S. food commodities to Zimbabwe under the Guaranteed Sales for Marketing (GSM) and PL480 Title I programs of USDA.
- Jan 1992 Alerts of pending food shortage crisis to AID/Washington by USAID/Zimbabwe
- 11 Feb 1992 Emergency Declaration by U.S. Ambassador
- Feb 1992 First meeting of donors held by UN Resident Representative at urging of USAID Director.
- Request from USAID/Zimbabwe for PL 480 Title II food program (never approved).

- Mar-Apr 92**    **OFDA drought assessment in Southern Africa.**
- USAID authorization of commitment of US\$ 1,160,000 of funds from the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program (SMIP) of ICRISAT to locate a suitable site and grow seeds of sorghum and pearl millet that could be used by farmers in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi in the next planting season.**
- May 1992**      **USDA credit guarantee for Zimbabwe's purchase of 177,000 MT of maize under section 102 of the GSM program.**
- Grant of Southern Africa Regional program funds to Spoornet (railways of South Africa) to help land-locked countries meet the foreign exchange costs of transport of food.**
- Addition of funds to UNCTAD's traffic improvement project, supported by the Southern Africa Regional Program, to introduce operational efficiencies and unlock nascent bottlenecks in cross border road and rail transport.**
- OFDA grant to Zimbabwe Red Cross and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for drought relief (Vitamin A supplements and water and sanitation).**
- May 1992**      **Arrival of FEWS (Famine Early Warning System project) staff to help Department of Social Welfare analyze district and household level data as a basis for identification of the most vulnerable groups in order to inform decisions on food targeting.**
- 29 May 1992**   **PL480 Title I agreement for 87,000 MT of maize and 10,000 MT of vegetable oil.**
- Jun 1992**       **USAID grant to World Food Program for support of the operations of the WFP/SADC Regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare and its branch office in Johannesburg, and for equipment and expertise to break bottlenecks in delivery of relief commodities.**
- 2 Jul 1992**     **PL480 Title I amendment for 69,000 MT of maize.**
- 22 Jul 1992**   **PL480 Title I amendment for 73,000 MT of maize.**
- 22 Jul 1992**   **Section 416 agreement for 58,000 MT of maize and 50,000 MT of sorghum.**
- Jul 1992**       **Completion of purchase of maize by USDA for GSM sale.**

Aug 1992 OFDA grant to Africare for emergency water supplies for drought-stricken countries of Southern Africa: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia.

2 Sep 1992 PL480 Title I amendment for 70,000 MT of wheat.

Sep 1992 Contract signed with Zimbabwe firm, Development Specialist Services, to verify the distribution of Section 416 maize and sorghum to recipients.

Contract with Deloitte Touche to review systems for managing and tracking imports of U.S. food commodities finds 98.6 percent accountability.

Contract with Zimbabwe firm, Probe Market Research, to analyze household food security status in five of the most vulnerable districts.

1 Oct 1992 U.S. Ambassador's declaration of a drought emergency, for 1993.

Oct 1992 AID/AFR grant to AFRICARE for recovery program to develop water resources in Zimbabwe.

USAID agreement with government on the use of local currency generations to support drought relief distribution and provide fertilizer for "crop packs" delivered to farmers for the planting season.

Oct 1992 AID/Washington contract with KPMG Peat Marwick to account for U.S. food commodities unloaded at ports for Zimbabwe (cancelled before completion).

end Oct 1992 First arrival in Zimbabwe of PL480 Title I maize; for distribution, maize from government stocks was added (to be reimbursed from the Section 416 donation that had not yet arrived).

Nov 1992 OFDA grant to Catholic Relief Services for seed distribution and water and sanitation.

?? Country team decision that the US\$ ?? available in the Ambassador's self-help fund would be dedicated to water projects in drought-distressed areas.

?? Allocation of funds (whose ??) for water projects carried out by Peace Corps Volunteers

4 Dec 1992 PL480 Title I amendment for 50,000 MT of maize.

mid Jan 1993 Arrival in Zimbabwe of Section 416 maize and sorghum; most maize and sorghum under this program were distributed within Zimbabwe by April 1993.

Oct 1993 First payments to government and NGOs to reimburse costs incurred beginning in October 1992 for ITSH (internal transport, storage and handling) maize and sorghum provided under Section 416.

### III. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY AND REGISTRATION FOR ASSISTANCE

Jan 1992 Rise in numbers of persons registered for government food assistance and food for work, from recent annual average of 500,000 to 2,100,000.

Apr 1992 Numbers registered for assistance rose to 2,800,000.

Jul 1992 Numbers registered for assistance total 4,500,000, and estimate of children under 5 years old requiring supplementary feeding is 750,000.

Sep-Oct 92 Second screening of registration for drought relief, involving Village Development Committees under direction of Department of Social Welfare; resulting reduction in roles of less than 10 percent.

Oct 1992 Most household reserves depleted; national registration for drought relief up to 5,400,000, or about over half the population.

Decision by government that the maximum it could sustain in maize distribution was 30,000 tons/month, sufficient for 6 m people to receive 5kg/month/person, or 1/3 of minimal daily sustenance level established in July.

Oct-Dec 92 Household survey sponsored by USAID and conducted by a Zimbabwean marketing analysis firm indicated that families in five most vulnerable districts of the country were receiving an average of 5.6 kg. of food aid and were able to meet their balance of their food needs through purchases from current income.

Nov 1992 Peak of 5,600,000 persons registered, of which 1,060,000 children.

Continuing inability to reach some 20% of registered needy people, mainly in remote areas.

Apr 1993 Registered needy down to 4,800,000 total, and 1,040,000 children.

Sep 1993 Department of Social Welfare registration of persons in drought prone areas in need of continued drought relief assistance up to 700,000, from 600,000 in April, as household stocks become depleted; Department anticipates average need in normal years of some 500,000.



#### IV. SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC FACTORS

- 1980s. Expansion of small farm production of food grains as result of agricultural policy that offered incentive prices for produce sold to the Grain Marketing Board and expanded agricultural services to small holders (extension, credit, training, depots, market access for females); percentage of marketed grains increased greatly, but quantities retained for on-farm storage decreased.
- Early 1991 Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) launched; included measures to sell off maize reserves to relieve the costs of storage and earn foreign exchange.
- Mid 1991 Food reserves depleted through program of reduction and larger than normal domestic sales following poor harvest due to insufficient late 1990 rains.
- 1992 Major economic downturn, due largely to the drought:
- Negative rate of economic growth of 8 percent, against anticipated 5 percent positive rate; negative rate of 11.5 percent in per capita terms.
- Official annual inflation rate 48 percent (but higher for lower income urban households), with foodstuffs up by 68 percent and transport 54 percent as of October, and electricity prices by 45 percent in the last calendar quarter.
- Credit squeeze, as a consequence of government borrowings to finance grain imports.
- Devaluation of 45 percent in September, following a change of similar magnitude during 1991, with subsequent 17 percent devaluation in early 1993.
- Increase in current account deficit from 9.6 percent of GDP to 17 percent, 1991 to 1992. Drought-related loss of export value of US\$554 million before end of 1992, with higher values projected; sharp increases in balance of payments and budget deficits.
- Serious deterioration in real wages, which were raised 10 percent on nominal basis for civil servants and 10-20 percent in industry.
- Decline of 40 percent in agricultural production, mainstay of the economy, leading to shortages of basic food commodities (maize, sugar, vegetable oil), reduction in manufacturing and loss of export earnings; maize production less than 20 percent of normal.

Loss of livestock (200,000 by mid-1993), leading to reductions in household income, export earnings and availability of draught power.

Decrease in industrial production of 9.5 percent in real terms, due largely to lack of agricultural inputs (cotton, sugar, oil seeds) and limited availability of water and hydro-electric power, as well as by lack of consumer demand in a contracting economy, and by credit squeeze as interest rates rose to over 50 percent and government borrowings expanded.

By mid-1993 Total required imports of 2.6 million MT of cereals.

Total reduction of 7000 in jobs in civil service and another 15,500 in formal sector employment; official unemployment rate 30 percent; jobs reduced to part time during drought not all restored; very high rate of underemployment in informal sector.

Jun 1992 Joint approval by WFP and FAO of initial allocation of 711,824 MT for a period of 12 months from WFP's International Emergency Food Reserve for targeted free distribution to estimated 7.8 million drought affected persons in 9/10 countries (later revised to 733,350 MT)

Needs for internally displaced and refugees in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique established at 398,000 MT; to be included under the ongoing WFP emergency operations.

## **V. POST DROUGHT ASSESSMENTS OF EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING WORKSHOPS**

Feb 1993 Thompson, Carol B. *Drought Management Strategies in Southern Africa: From Relief through Rehabilitation to Vulnerability Reduction*. UNICEF Policy Monitoring Unit for Southern Africa (Windhoek), in association with Food Security Unit, Southern African Development Community (SADC). February 1993.

Apr 1993 Zimbabwe, Department of Social Welfare. Kadoma Review Meeting: Drought Relief Program

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Regional Disaster Management Workshop, 4-8 April 1993. Harare, Zimbabwe. Included Republic of South Africa and OFDA. Report due November 1993.

May 1993 M.Borsotti, UNDP. *Drought Relief Program in Zimbabwe, Critical Considerations on its Implementation: Lessons Learnt and Future Steps*.

- Muir, Ann. *Livelihood Strategies and the Household Economy in Binga District, Zimbabwe*. Save the Children Fund (UK). Harare, Zimbabwe, May 1993.
- Jun 1993     D.Hicks, World Food Program. *An Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Drought Relief Program 1992/1993*.
- A.R.White, UNCTAD. *Facilitating the Transport of Emergency Grain Supplies: Lesson to be Learned*.
- R.Ewbank, UNICEF. *An Evaluation of the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme*.
- Matindike, S.S.P. "The Child Supplementary Feeding Programme: Observations of NGOs." Drought Relief and Rehabilitation Committee of NANGO. Harare, Zimbabwe. June 23, 1993.
- Jul 1993     Zimbabwe, Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit. *Assessment of the Response to the 1991/92 Drought in the SADC Region*.
- Aug 1993     *Impact Assessment of SADC/ICRISAT 1992/93 Emergency Seed Multiplication and Distribution Project*.
- Zimbabwe, Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare, and UNICEF. *Findings from the Third Round of Sentinel Surveillance for Social Dimensions of Adjustment Monitoring*.
- Sep 1993     SADC Regional Drought Management Workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe, 13-16 September 1993, to document experiences, discuss issues and make recommendations for the future; to be followed by a series of national workshops, beginning in Namibia in November.
- C.Tobaiwa. *Zimbabwe: The Response to the 1992 Drought in the Context of Long-Term Development Objectives*. Country paper prepared for the SADC Regional Drought Management Workshop.
- H.Hale, EURONAIID. *Evaluation of NGO Food Distribution*.
- D.Rohrback, ICRISAT. *Impact Assessment of the SADC/ICRISAT Drought Relief Emergency Production of Sorghum and Pearl Millet Seed*.
- J.P.Mason and M.Lebanc, USAID. *Evaluation of Africare Emergency Water Relief Regional Project: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia*.

Oct 1993      Provincial Development Committee-sponsored workshop: Masvingo Province after the Drought: Lessons of the Past and Prospects for the Future.

WHO Inter-country meeting on emergency preparedness and response in Southern Africa.

In process as of October 1993:

Study by Edward Clay, Charlotte Benson, John Borton, Tony Killick and David Norse, for Overseas Development Institute. "The Impact of Drought on Sub-Saharan African Economics and Options for the Mitigation of Such Impacts by National Governments and the International Community." [to cover Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, two Sahel countries]

Southern Africa Foundation for Education and Research. "Evaluation of the Agricultural Drought Recovery Programme with a View to Drawing Lessons for Future Drought Mitigation in the Agricultural Sector." Harare, Zimbabwe.

WHO. [report by Dr. Loretti of October workshop on health issues in the drought response]

World Food Program. Evaluation of the WFP-Assisted Regional Emergency Operation, Southern Africa: EMOP 5052/60 - Assistance to Drought Victims

Oxfam-U.K. A Drought Review Program: the Oxfam Experience.

Pending      IFRC, Assessment of Supplementary Feeding Programs in Zimbabwe and Zambia, due January 1994.

Zimbabwe National Planning Agency workshop to discuss future planning and roles of government, NGOs and commercial sector.

Completion of a white paper on the drought relief effort by the Zimbabwe government.


Regional workshop on experience of the transport sector in the drought response (January 1994).


## INFORMATION PAPER

BEIRA CORRIDOR GROUP


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
## RAILWAYS AND PORTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA






## NACALA CORRIDOR





## LIMPOPO CORRIDOR



The systems which constitute the Beira Corridor are the road, rail, pipeline and electricity powerlines. The tarmac road runs for 298 kms from the Zimbabwe Border at Machipanda to the City and Port of Beira on the Mozambican Coast, where the Port is undergoing a complete rehabilitation. The pipeline runs parallel with the road.

The railway is a single line Southern African gauge which traverses the provinces of Manica and Sofala for the 317 kms between Mutare and Beira. The railway line was refurbished between 1985 and 1988.

The powerlines run from the Chicamba Real Dam to Beira in close proximity to the road. The Pungwe and Buzi rivers flood seasonally which influences the agriculture in the hinterland and the depth of the Pungwe estuary. The heavy siltation results in a requirement for maintenance dredging to the Macuti Channel which permits accesses to Beira Port in the Pungwe estuary.

### **NACALA CORRIDOR**

The Corridor is presently served by a railway for the 615 kms from Entre Lagos in Niassa Province to the deep water port of Nacala in Nampula Province. The railway is undergoing a full rehabilitation which should be complete within three years. A branch line runs from Cuamba to Lichinga.

There is a tarmac road between Nacala and Nampula in regular use with convoy escorts and there are plans to upgrade the existing road from Nampula to Cuamba in the future.

The Port of Nacala has been recently refurbished with a container handling system complementing the existing general cargo facilities and an excellent working surface for the port equipments.

### **THE TETE CORRIDOR**


The Tete Corridor is a tarred 262 km road crossing the Tete Province from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean Border to the Mozambican Border at Zobue. The road has been comprehensively resheeted between Nyamapanda and the City of Tete, where it crosses the Zambezi river over the Tete Bridge.

The road between Tete and Zobue has not been maintained with a good surface and all transit traffic is escorted as convoys.

### **THE LIMPOPO CORRIDOR**

The Limpopo Corridor is a 534 kms rail link from Chicualacuala to Maputo City and Port. This rail link is still undergoing rehabilitation but it is in current use for commercial transit traffic. The resumption of commercial traffic through the provinces of Gaza and Maputo by rail recommenced in 1991.

There is a tarred road from Maputo to the river bridge at Barragem across the Limpopo River. From Barragem there is a dirt road to the Zimbabwe Border.



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# Annex C: U.S. Assistance to Zimbabwe

FOOD COMMODITY	AMOUNT	VALUE	PROGRAM
Delivered	(tons)	U.S. Dollars	Title
Maize	91,300	\$ 10,000,000	GSM - Guarantee
Maize	86,175	\$ 10,000,000	GSM - Guarantee
Maize	250,000	\$ 25,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Wheat	70,000	\$ 10,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Maize	50,000	\$ 5,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Maize	58,000	\$ 19,870,370	Section 416 - Grant
Sorghum	50,000	\$ 17,129,630	Section 416 - Grant
Maize	85,000	\$ 31,315,789	Section 416/WFP - Grant
Maize	10,000	\$ 3,684,211	Section 416/WFP - Grant (Refugee)
Sub-Total Cereals	750,475	\$132,000,000	
Edible Oil	10,860	\$ 5,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Sub-Total All Commodities	761,335	\$137,000,000	

## Non-Food Aid - All Grant

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance	
Rural Water Rehabilitation	US\$ 50,000
UNICEF	US\$ 950,000
American Red Cross	US\$ 144,000
Save the Children (U.S.)	US\$ 313,803
Africare	US\$ 427,784
Catholic Relief Services	US\$ 925,194
Peace Corps	US\$ 40,000
Sorghum & Millet Improvement Project	US\$ 1,160,000

Ambassador's Self-Help Fund: Water	US\$	328,780
Food Targeting (FEWS)	US\$	1,600,000
Regional Drought Emergency Logistics Project (Zimbabwe component)	US\$	2,000,000
Zimbabwe Drought Fund-Counterpart Funds	US\$	2,200,000
Drought Relief-Counterpart Funds	US\$	7,547,000
DSW - Drivers		
DSW - Clerical		
Crop Pack Program		
<b>Sub-Total: Non-Food</b>	<b>US\$</b>	<b>17,686,561</b>
<b>Total U. S. Assistance</b>	<b>US\$</b>	<b>154,686,561</b>

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## **Annex E: Statement of Work**

### **SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION**

#### **I. Background**

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

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## II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude. ●
2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

## III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

### A. Causes of the Emergency

- o Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.
- o To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

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**B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning**

- o Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- o How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?
- o Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- o Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- o What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- o Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- o How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?
- o How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- o What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

**C. Donor Coordination**

- o How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- o Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

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- o How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- o What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- o How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?
- o What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- o What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- o What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- o What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

**D. Needs Assessment**

- o What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- o Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- o Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- o Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

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E. Project Design

- o How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- o Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- o Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- o Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?
- o By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- o Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- o To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- o How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- o How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?
- o Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- o Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- o Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of P1,480 food?

**F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation**

- o Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, FVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- o What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- o How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

**G. Timeliness of Emergency Response**

- o Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
  - Needs assessment
  - Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
  - Procurement of commodities
  - Delivery of commodities to the country
  - Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
  - Arrival of technical assistance
- o Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

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the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- o If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

#### H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- o Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- o Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?
- o Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- o Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups
- o Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes
- o Improved nutritional and health status of target groups
- o Decreased infant and child mortality
- o Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- o Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- o Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

## I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- o Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.
- o Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, FVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- o Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
  - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
  - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?
  - c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- o The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- o How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- o Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

- o The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

#### **IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration**

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logistical support costs will be provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

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Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

#### V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

#### VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

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## VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

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